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Uniquely amongst industrialized countries worldwide, Germany does not im-
pose a general speed limit on highways. This is different in the Netherlands, where 
a limit of 130km/h is implemented. The direct border between the two countries 
provides an opportunity to construct a natural experiment and analyze the social 
impact of a general speed limit of 130 km/h for passenger cars on German high-
ways. I quantify the social welfare impacts from travel time, accident victims, fuel 
consumption and emissions for two highway sections in the federal state of North 
Rhine-Westphalia, Germany. The results are obtained by a descriptive comparison 
of micro data on travel speeds and accidents, collected on the two designated cross-
border highways. In the central case, I conclude that on both highways a speed limit 
would be beneficial from the social and private perspective. The impacts found on 
the two highways differ in magnitude, but the qualitative decisions are identical and 
sufficiently robust to their core assumptions.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Uniquely amongst industrialized countries worldwide, Germany does not impose a gen-
eral speed limit on highways. This exceptional traffic policy and the resulting opportunity 
to legally drive at any possible speed on a public road even makes “Autobahn” – the 
German term for highway – a word widely known beyond the country’s borders. The total 
highway system in Germany spans roughly 25,767 km, 70% of which remain without a 
speed limit today, while the other 30% are either subject to a static speed limit (≈ 21%) 
or a variable speed limit system (≈ 9%) (see Kollmus et al., 2017, p.4).1 For the unre-
stricted parts, a speed of 130 km/h is officially recommended but not obligatory.2 Some 
vehicle categories are excluded from the rule and underlie a general speed limit. For ex-
ample, trucks and busses are subject to a limit of 80km/h and 100km/h respectively (see 
Deutscher Bundestag: §18 Abs.5 Satz 2 StVO). This leaves passenger cars as the major 
vehicle type that is free in the speed choice, and thus, makes this particular category the 
focus of this thesis.  
Speed limits have always had their advocates and critics. A vast variety of stakeholders 
from science, politics and Non- governmental organizations (NGOs) engage in the dis-
cussion about the effects of speed limits on several factors. Arguments against or in favor 
of limits range from obvious aspects like the trade-off between travel speed and road 
safety to less salient facets, for example substitution between road types or even the loss 
of political support. In the course of this, different scientific disciplines are affected and 
the debate about the desirability of a speed limit becomes complex and often emotionally 
charged. The latter is especially true for Germany, where a change in policy would con-
strain a road users’ former freedom of choice to some upper bound. This freedom of 
choice, however, has long been considered tradition by many Germans. Sometimes it is 
asserted that also the strong automotive industry is interested in retaining this freedom, 
which even led to comparisons with the U.S.-American incorrigibility when it comes to 
the citizens ‘right to bear arms (see Hengstenberg, 2013). 
Evidence suggests that the share of speed limit opponents in Germany remains high. In a 
representative survey from 2013, 62% of respondents rejected a general speed limit on 
highways of 120 km/h (see ZDF Politbarometer, 2013). In contrast, more current polls 
find that a general speed limit may achieve a thin majority, as 52% of the 2,000 inter-
viewees in 2017 answered in favor of a general speed limit (see Deutscher 
                                                 
 
1 The figures in the report are based on 2015 data. Length of the highways is counted as distance kilometers, 
i.e. one km of highway with two driving directions is counted as two km. 
2 However, in case of an accident, a strong exceedance of 130km/h is likely to cause partial liability. 
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Verkehrssicherheitsrat, 2017). Yet, there was no particular statement on the level of this 
hypothetical limit. The exact level is a crucial variable for gathering public support. Evi-
dence from 2015 indicates that the resistance of German citizens towards an overall speed 
limit is negatively correlated to its level. A majority of 56% would welcome a 150 km/h 
limit, but this share decreases to a mere 11% when respondents are confronted with a 
limit of 100 km/h (see Schmidt, 2015).  
Implicitly, the respondents base their assessments on weighing of individual (private) cost 
and benefits. Even if this may lead to an optimal decision from a personal point of view, 
external effects are usually not considered. This is potentially rendering the outcome of 
the sum of decisions unwanted from a normative welfare perspective. Looking through 
the eyes of a social planner, it is well conceivable that introducing a speed limit is leading 
from the status-quo closer towards Pareto efficiency – the state of society in which no one 
can be made better-off without simultaneously taking away welfare from someone else 
(see Elvik, 2009, p.33).   
A tool for assessing policy measures in terms of economic welfare is Cost-Benefit Anal-
ysis (CBA). It aims at rationalizing the decision-making process of policy-makers by try-
ing to consider all relevant impacts of a policy or project to society as a whole. Therefore, 
it is interchangeably called economic or social cost-benefit analysis (SCBA) (see Board-
man et al., 2014, p. 2). 
This master thesis offers a SCBA for a general static speed limit for passenger cars on 
German highways. Along the way, I will seek answers to the following core research 
questions:  
 
R1. Which arguments should be taken into account when economically analyzing the 
impacts of a speed limit on highways?  
R2. How would a speed limit affect the identified impacts?  
R3. Should there – from the perspective of normative welfare theory – be a general 
speed limit on German highways?  
 
Several important factors, which are affected by a speed limit, are identified. Based on 
the four core impacts opportunity cost of travel time, road safety benefits, emissions and 
fuel consumption, I find that for the two highways analyzed a speed limit of 130 km/h 
would increase welfare to society. This even holds from a private perspective, which in-
dicates that road users may be poorly informed and misperceive the trade-off between 
private time savings and fuel costs from speeding. The results are obtained from a de-
scriptive comparison of key micro data collected on two designated cross-border high-
ways between Germany and the Netherlands.  
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These findings and analyzing speed limit impacts in general, are important for two main 
reasons. First, there is a large research gap on this specific topic in Germany. To my 
knowledge, there exists no SCBA for a speed limit in Germany in the literature. On fed-
eral state level Scholz, Schmallowsky, & Wauer (2007) conduct a CBA for the introduc-
tion of a general speed limit in the federal state of Brandenburg. Incorporating benefits 
from reduced accidents and costs from additional travel time, they calculate an annual 
social net benefit of 5.3 mio € at a speed limit of 130 km/h. Despite this work, it is rea-
sonable to claim that speed limit research in Germany is essentially missing. Conse-
quently, the political debate is dominated by and based on grey literature, such as reports 
from automotive or environmental associations, which potentially leads to prejudiced 
analyses in both directions – for and against a speed limit. Second, a classic justification 
for speed constraints is their potential to save lives and increase road safety, both of which 
being of supreme political importance. The German Ministry of Transportation and Dig-
ital Infrastructure (BMVI) states in their road safety program that “every road death is 
one too many” (see BMVI, 2011, p.5) and set the goal to decrease road deaths by 40% 
until 2020. The ministry’s progress report shows that by 2014 a reduction of approxi-
mately 16% has been achieved, leaving the initially set target “a very ambitious but 
achievable goal” (see BMVI, 2015, p.8). Still, the two strongest German parties, the So-
cial Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) and the Christian Democratic Union of Ger-
many with its political ally, the Christian Social Union in Bavaria (CDU/CSU) rule out 
general speed limits as a contributing measure. On the other hand, two of the other estab-
lished parties still support a general speed limit. The green party “Bündnis 90/Die Grü-
nen” advocates a general maximum speed of 120 km/h, thereby sharing the opinion of 
the left-wing party “Die Linke” on the topic.3  
The thesis is designed as follows. Chapter 2 provides a literature overview clustered by 
the identified essential speed limit impacts. In chapter 3, Cost-Benefit Analysis as the 
analytical framework is introduced briefly. Chapter 4 defines the policy analyzed and the 
perspective taken when assessing the impacts. In chapter 5 the impact categories consid-
ered are presented. In chapter 6 the estimated impacts from a speed limit are quantified 
in magnitude using descriptive data comparison. Chapter 7 is devoted to valuing the esti-
mated impacts in monetary terms and classify them as costs and benefits. The chapters 8, 
9 and 10 present the results, provide a discussion and close the work with a conclusion.  
                                                 
 
3 In their 2017 federal election programs, both parties explicitly promote a general speed limit of 120km/h. 
For download in German language available under: https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/btw17/pro-
grammvergleich/programmvergleich-verkehr-101.html (link last updated 05.08.2018).    
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature research for this thesis has been a complex task. Speed limits affect multiple 
impact categories, most of which have developed their own stream of academic literature, 
for example environmental studies, road safety analyses and several others. Therefore, 
the collected studies are clustered and reviewed by the main impact categories identified 
across the works. Joint studies that embrace several impacts are rare, but an outstanding 
article, which serves as a basis and point of orientation for this thesis, is van Benthem 
(2015). He conducts a wide-ranging CBA for U.S. speed limit changes on freeways in 
1987 and 1996. The study analyzes the effect of speed limit changes on four main varia-
bles, namely travel speed, accidents, air pollution and health. Based on these impacts an 
optimal limit is approximated close to 55 mph (roughly equivalent to 88.5 km/h). 4 When 
comparing his selection of outcome variables with other speed limit studies, one finds 
that the majority of important effects discussed matches these categories. The literature 
review adopts this categorization and summarizes the literature divided per impact.  
 
Travel Speed 
Travel speed is included in almost all studies on speed limit impacts. Folgerø et al. (2017) 
investigate a 20 km/h reduction in speed limits in the urban area of Oslo, Norway. From 
Nov, 1st 2004 till March 2005 the municipality of Oslo imposed an environmental speed 
limit (ESL) of 60 km/h instead of 80 km/h on an urban national road. The policy contin-
ued until 2012 and was expanded to two other urban roads. Using a regression disconti-
nuity design around the cut-off date (Nov, 1st) and data from three speed measurement 
stations, they estimate a reduction in mean travel speed of 5.8 km/h (see Folgerø et al., 
2017, p.27).  
Changes in 1987 and 1995 in the U.S. National Maximum Speed Law (NMSL) and their 
impacts in California, Washington and Oregon were analyzed by van Benthem (2015). 
He employs a difference in difference estimator on a large set of measurement data, find-
ing that a 10-mph increase in speed limits translates into higher actual mean speeds of 3 
to 4 mph (see van Benthem, 2015, p.49).  
Gates et al. (2015) analyze expected impacts of an increase in speed limits from 55 to 65 
mph on high-speed roadways proposed in Michigan in 2014. Using radar guns, they col-
lect a sample of field speed data at 100 observation sites along Michigan non-freeway 
trunkline routes. Interpretation of their results should be made with care since they only 
have one site at which travelers were allowed to go up to 65 mph and the section has two 
                                                 
 
4 1 mph ≈ 1.6 km/h.  
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lanes in each direction separated by a raised median, which is uncommon for the Michi-
gan trunkline system. However, they observe a difference in average speeds of passenger 
cars between the 55 and 65 mph sections of 5.8 mph while the share of vehicles exceeding 
the limit fell dramatically from 77.2% to 43.0% (see Gates et al., 2015, p. 24ff.).  
Retting and Teoh (2008) investigate changes in travel speed, ten years after the repeal of 
the NMSL in 1995. They measure speeds at 26 sites in five different states at which pre-
vious studies had collected the same data in 1996, shortly after the states regained author-
ity over speed limit policies. Their approach accounts for the sample selection by keeping 
factors such as daytime, weather and traffic flow constant during data collection. Then, 
conclusions about travel speed changes are drawn from a descriptive comparison. For 
rural interstates in two states where the speed limit remained constant, they observe an 
increase in mean speeds of 3-4 mph suggesting a rising speed trend over time. Conversely, 
a speed limit was imposed in Montana after having no numeric limit in 1996 and mean 
travel speeds decreased by 2 mph (see Retting and Teoh, 2008, p. 122f.).   
Ashenfelter and Greenstone (2004) take advantage of the 1987 amendment of the NMSL, 
which allowed U.S. states to increase speed limits from 55 to 65 mph on rural interstates. 
In order to provide an estimate for the value of a statistical life they estimate and monetize 
changes in travel time and fatality risk resulting from a speed limit increase. Collecting 
data from speed measurement loops in 21 states for the period 1982 to 1993, they conduct 
a before-after study and estimate an increase of about 2.5 mph by means of difference in 
difference estimation.  
This take of literature does undeniably not capture all studies on the topic. Anastasopoulos 
and Mannering (2016) as well as Mannering (2007) use survey data to study the effect of 
several factors including speed limits on the respondents’ stated choice of speed. Exten-
sive literature reviews were carried out by Savolainen et al. (2014), Kockelmann (2006), 
who broadly agree that “… a change in speed limit generally results in a less-than-equiv-
alent change in average speed” (see Kockelmann, 2006, p. 10). Wilmot and Khanal (1999) 
also examine literature of speed limit effects on speed and safety, concluding that motor-
ists often do not adhere to speed limits and choose their speed based on their personal 
perception of safety.  
The literature provides an indication of how speed limits may affect actual travel speeds. 
The advantage of most previous studies is that they were able to rely on a certain change 
from limit x to limit y, which is different to the unique situation in Germany where no 
maximum speed limits constrain a driver’s choice. Therefore, it remains an empirical 
question, to which extent and even in which direction the introduction of a limit would 
alter mean speeds. This question clearly depends on the relative level of a limit imposed 
to current average speeds.  
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Accidents 
As seen in the previous paragraph, changes in speed limits are likely to achieve their 
purpose of dragging traffic speeds in a certain intended direction. Consequently, we ex-
pect travel speed to increase or decrease as a result of speed limit changes of sufficient 
magnitude. Moreover, there could be changes in the traffic flow. Speed limit changes 
might render traffic more or less homogenous. Both these factors have already been dis-
cussed in early road accident analyses, which created two streams of thought. Lave (1985) 
calls them “speed kills” and “variance kills”. The speed-kills advocates argue that higher 
speeds come with more danger while the variance-kills proponents support the idea of 
deviations from mean speeds being the cause of accidents.5 From common sense and the 
laws of physics researchers started to analyze the effect of speed on accidents. Solomon 
(1964) initially presented evidence that chance of involvement in an accident increases 
with deviation from mean speed (“variance kills”) whereas severity of accidents increases 
with level of speed (“speed kills”).  
Modern studies vary considerably with respect to methods and the inclusion of one or 
both of the named effects as well as road types. Farmer (2016) analyzes speed limit im-
pacts on traffic fatalities only. He employs data on traffic deaths per billion vehicle miles 
traveled (VMT) clustered for 41 U.S. states between 1993 and 2013. For high-speed roads 
which covers interstates and freeways, his poisson regression yields an estimated 8.3% 
(17%) increase in fatality rates when speed limits increase by 5 (10) mph (see Farmer, 
2016, p. 5). The study thus presents evidence that raising a speed limit results in additional 
road deaths, which can plausibly be categorized as the most severe accidents.  
Van Benthem (2015) not only uses data on fatal accidents but integrates all highway ac-
cidents to explore the impact of the 10 mph speed limit increase in 1987 for Washington 
and Oregon. He sorts the accidents by severity group and assigns them to treatment (10 
mph change in limit) and non-treatment highways (no change in limit). Using a negative 
binomial regression specification, he presents evidence that accidents (likewise normal-
ized by VMT) went up significantly for all categories while showing a clear ordering of 
larger increases for more severe accident classes. Put differently, the distribution of acci-
dents was shifted towards more severe accidents and increased in level. For example, he 
estimates 13.2% and 44% surges for property damage and fatal accidents respectively. 
Thereby he confirms the opinions of both the “speed kills” and “variance kills” propo-
nents, namely that higher speeds lead to additional and more severe accidents (see van 
Benthem, 2015, p. 50f.). In contrast, he does not find signs that his accident results are 
driven by less homogenous traffic (variance kills) since the estimated changes in travel 
                                                 
 
5 Kockelmann (2006), p. 10f. as well as Gates et al. (2015), p. 7ff. wrap up the early studies and evolution 
of discussion on the two streams so I will concentrate on more recent findings.  
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speed (see previous section) are similar for both mean speeds as well as 85th percentile 
speeds. This indicates that the variance in speeds did not increase significantly due to the 
policy change (see van Benthem, 2015, p.49).6  
Savolainen et al. (2014) examine effects on fatalities from speed limit policies at U.S. 
national level and for the state of Michigan separately. Within the countrywide analysis, 
they aggregate states by differences in rural interstate speed limits.7 They report parame-
ter estimates of a negative binomial model including random effects to account for state 
and time fixed effects. The coefficients imply that fatalities constantly increased with 
posted speed limits in the period 1999-2011. Increases in fatalities for a given change in 
speed limit are shown to be greater for lower levels of initial speed limits. On average, 
states with a maximum speed of 70 mph (75 mph) were expected to experience 31% 
(54%) more fatalities compared to states with a 65 mph limit (see Savolainen et al., 2014, 
p. 45ff.). This gives rise to the idea, that the lower the initial speed limit, the higher the 
effects of a given nominal change may be.  
Turning towards Germany, Manner and Wünsch-Ziegler (2013) note that “… accident 
severities on German Autobahns have not yet been analyzed in the literature… ” (see 
Manner and Wünsch-Ziegler, 2013, p.40). They conduct research on several aspects in-
fluencing accident severity. Based on figures from the federal state of North Rhine-West-
phalia from 2009 to 2011, they categorize accidents into fatal, severe injury, minor injury 
and property damage only. Since there exists no obligatory speed limit in Germany, they 
use a single dummy variable indicating a speed limit of 100 km/h or less. Interestingly, 
the pseudo-elasticities of their multinomial logit model produce counterintuitive results. 
If a speed limit was in place, it is estimated to increase the risk of an accident in one of 
the categories with person damage and decrease the probability of property damage acci-
dents. The probability of a fatal, severe or minor injury accident increases by roughly 
41%, 16% and 53% respectively, while the probability of only property damage decreases 
by 15%. This unexpected result arguably is due to speed limits being installed at sites 
where more accidents occur anyway (see Manner and Wünsch-Ziegler, 2013, p. 44). An 
alternative specification using hourly traffic instead of daily data changes this finding and 
produces results consistent with expectations. In this setting, the probabilities for fatal 
and severe injury are reduced by 51% and 19%, whereas minor injury accident chances 
rise by 6% and property damage collision remain almost constant. Qualitatively, they 
                                                 
 
6 He notes that this finding is subject to limitations, e.g. due to speed data truncation. 
7 As categories they use maximum speed limits within a state of 60-65 mph; 70 mph; 75+ mph (see Savo-
lainen et al. (2014), p. 45).   
  
P a g e | 8  
 
conclude that based on their data set no clear impact of speed limits on accident severity 
could be found (see Manner and Wünsch-Ziegler, 2013, p. 46f.).8  
However, the general notion that accidents and accident severity tend to move in the same 
direction as the change in allowed maximum speed is supported in several other studies.9  
 
Air Pollution  
The combustion process of any vehicle operated with fossil fuels produces polluting emis-
sions. These greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and air pollutants jointly constitute the 
third important impact category. Under EU transport legislation, there are five regulated 
pollutants which the European Environmental Agency (EEA) lists as follows:   
1. Carbon dioxide (CO2) – the major and well-known GHG responsible for climate 
change acceleration and harmful to human health. 
2. Hydrocarbons (HC) – result from incomplete combustion in the engine. HCs are 
toxic to human health and contribute to ground level formation of ozone, which 
in turn harms lungs, eyes etc.  
3. Carbon monoxide (CO) – highly toxic gas that is especially harmful to people 
with cardiovascular diseases and contributes to ground level ozone as well.  
4. Particulate matter (PM) – is only partly emitted through the tailpipes but the other 
share stems from abrasion emissions (wear of tires, breaks, clutches, etc.). PM is 
highly damaging to the respiratory system and causes cardiovascular diseases.  
5. Nitrogen oxides (NOX) – constitutes a group of chemicals comprising NO and 
NO2. These also form ground level ozone and contribute to the acidification and 
eutrophication of waters and soils. 
  
With the exception of PM, the major share of the emissions listed above occurs from 
exhaust emissions (see European Environment Agency, 2016, p. 9ff.).10 Hence, if speed 
limits are to influence driving speeds and conditions, which in consequence will alter fuel 
consumption, these emissions should be sensitive to speed limit changes. As shown in the 
following paragraphs, they do find attention in several studies.  
                                                 
 
8 The authors note that these effects may partially be driven by the presence of construction sites, which are 
not controlled for in the alternative specification. In addition, the estimated elasticities are not statistically 
significant with exception of severe injury accidents.  
9 See e.g. Elvik (2013), Pauw et al. (2014), Kockelmann (2006), Ashenfelter and Greenstone (2004).  
10 Non-exhaust PM Emissions, e.g. wear from tires, brakes, road surface etc., oftentimes are similar or 
higher than exhaust PM emissions (see Amato et al. (2014), p.32). Timmers and Achten (2016) even con-
clude that the share of exhaust PM emissions may only be 5% to 10 % of total PM emissions from road 
transport. It can be expected that this effect is more pronounced in urban areas than in rural (see e.g. sup-
plementary excel file to Klein et al. (2017).  
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Folgerø et al. (2017) evaluate the effectiveness of an environmental speed limit in Oslo, 
Norway on NO2, NOX, and PM10, PM2.5 separately.11 They include five years of hourly 
measurement data from three air-quality monitoring stations located directly at the roads 
in question. In their regression results, they do not find a discontinuity in any of the pol-
lutants, indicating no effect from the measure. In some cases their estimates are even 
positive but insignificant (see Folgerø et al., 2017, p. 17ff.).  
Different conclusions are presented in van Benthem (2015). Using a difference in differ-
ence estimator on a linear regression specification, he estimates the speed limit effects on 
CO, NO2 and PM10 as well as ozone (O3).12 By varying a so-called buffer zone, the pe-
rimeter around the treatment highway in which one assumes to measure an impact in the 
data from the speed limit policy, he includes or drops the daily data from certain moni-
toring stations within or without the zone. It appears to be “reasonable to assume effects 
for a distance of up to 10 miles” (see van Benthem, 2015, p. 54.). For the 10-mph speed 
limit increase and the central case, which defines treatment stations as those, located in a 
vicinity of 3 miles around the highways, he finds increases of 23% for CO, 15% for NO2 
and 11% for O3 but no effect on PM10. The latter result confirmed his expectations, for 
which he argues that a large fraction of PM10 is being emitted by diesel trucks which were 
unaffected by the policy (see van Benthem, 2015, p. 55). Additionally, within the cost-
benefit part of his work, changes in CO2 are inferred from fuel consumption effects and 
valued afterwards.  
Bel et al. (2015) analyze the air pollution impacts of a speed limit reduction and the in-
troduction of a variable speed system in the Barcelona metropolitan area where maximum 
speed limits were reduced from 120 (100) km/h by 40 (20) km/h. They use a fixed effects 
quantile regression model to generalize a difference in difference model. By this means 
the differences in the quantiles of treatment and control speed limit zones is measured. 
Their controls include traffic, temperature, other general weather data and even a binary 
variable for Sahara dust and fire. For NOX and PM10 concentrations showed no or even a 
slightly positive effect. They adapt the approach to data from another area with variable 
maximum speeds and add, that those seem to succeed in improving air quality (see Bel et 
al., 2015, p. 81ff.).  
A different method is followed in Savolainen et al. (2014) who use traffic speed data and 
road types as an input to simulate emission cases for 60 and 75 mph. They present changes 
for different pollutants and three vehicle types, namely passenger cars, light commercial 
trucks and motorcycles. Maintaining the order of vehicle type as above, they find changes 
                                                 
 
11 PM emissions are categorized by their size. PM10 and PM2.5 mean, that the particulates in the air have a 
maximum diameter of 10 microns (μm) and 2.5 μm respectively (see Umweltbundesamt, 2009, p.4).  
12 As argued above, Ozone is not amongst the regulated pollutants but HC and NO2 contribute to its for-
mation and may therefore be captured indirectly. 
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of +20.2%, +21.5%, -2.5% for CO; +12.7%, +9.7%, -4.7 for NOX and +12.3%, -2.5%, -
13.3% for PM10 and PM2.5 (see Savolainen et al., 2014, p.117). These numbers indicate 
that raising speed (limits) increases CO and NOX emissions except from motorcycles but 
decreases PM except from passenger cars. 
NOX and PM10 development has also been studied in the setting of a speed management 
zone with stringent enforcement (automatic fining supported by camera surveillance) on 
highway sections in Rotterdam and Amsterdam, The Netherlands. Keuken et al. (2010) 
argue that not only speed reductions but also reductions in dynamics of travel speeds, 
(which basically means stop-and-go traffic, congestion etc.) are effective in mitigating 
emissions. They apply two strategies to identify the pollution impacts of the 80km/h zones 
with strict enforcement. The first uses regression analysis on air quality data collected on 
site prior to and throughout the 80km/h test periods. The second method uses traffic data 
to identify changes in traffic dynamics on which they apply emission factors to approxi-
mate NOX and PM10 reductions. Both approaches yield similar results: NOX decreased by 
20-30% and PM10 was reduced by 5-20% across the two cities and approaches (see 
Keuken et al., 2010, p. 2525). Again in some contrast, Dijkema et al. (2008) analyze the 
same policy in the Netherlands and find a significant decrease of about 7% in PM10 but 
no impact on NOX.  
Amongst the studies presented above, all works discussed effects on NOx (or NO2 sepa-
rately) and PM (PM10 and/or PM2.5), some considered CO, which is stressing the im-
portance of these factors. The literature creates the notion that impacts of speed policies 
on air pollution are ambiguous. Interestingly, the all so well-known carbon dioxide (CO2) 
is mentioned only in the paper by van Benthem (2015) and is analytically separated from 
the other impacts in his study. This draws the dichotomy between global and local air 
pollution. Global air pollution points towards GHG emissions triggering climate change 
while the local pollutants focused on in the review are rather concerned with direct human 
health issues. The subsequent paragraph is concerned with these health issues evoked by 
local traffic pollution.  
 
Health impacts from local air pollution 
The chain of thought for this paragraph directly links to the previous one. It has been 
emphasized above that, if speed limits are to influence driving speeds and conditions, 
which in consequence will alter fuel consumption, the emissions mentioned above should 
be sensitive to speed limit changes. Now, when emissions depend on speed limits, the 
limit turns into an instrument to improve health for the population exposed to bad air 
caused by vehicles. Therefore, “[a] ﬁnal input for the cost–beneﬁt analysis is the effect of 
the higher speed limits, through increased pollution, on health” (see van Benthem, 2015, 
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p.55). He stresses that traffic emissions can lead to severe adverse health effects. Exam-
ples are increased prematurity and lower birthweights as well as infant mortality. They 
may put forth cardiovascular and respiratory diseases and cause premature death.13  
Employing data from six years of birth records from California as well as geocoding 
techniques in order to localize mother’s living distance to treatment highways, his main 
finding is that a 10 mph increase in maximum speeds led to 17-45 additional fetal deaths 
per year (or a 9,4% increase in probability for third trimester fetal death). His infant health 
results are insignificant and the adult health effects are not included but later inferred 
from pollution concentrations within the CBA (see van Benthem, 2015, p.58).  
The estimation results raise awareness that speed limits may in fact decrease fetal deaths 
if they can amend the traffic emission correctly. Unfortunately, other studies which di-
rectly investigate the relationship of speed limits to (infant/fetal) health impacts could not 
be found in the literature.14  
The broad literature on the main impact categories that has been reviewed shall provide 
a foundation and intuition concerning the most important aspects of speed limit analysis. 
Now, it is turned towards the methodological part of this thesis where CBA as the desig-
nated assessment tool is introduced briefly before going into detail with the policy anal-
ysis.  
3 THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK – CBA  
“CBA is an analytical tool to be used to appraise an investment decision in order to 
assess the welfare change attributable to it […]. The purpose of CBA is to facilitate 
a more efficient allocation of resources, demonstrating the convenience for society 
of a particular intervention rather than possible alternatives.” 
European Commission (2015) 
 
The terms “investment decision” and “intervention” in the quote above may equally be 
replaced by “policy” or “project”, which does not change the underlying premise. Assist-
ing in finding a more efficient allocation of travel behavior is the key that turns the anal-
ysis of speed limits into an economic matter. Maximum speed policies induce impacts 
affecting the welfare of the citizens of a defined society. The cost- benefit analysis aims 
to quantify and monetize these welfare changes and compares the resulting social costs 
and benefits to make a recommendation in favor or against a policy. Usually, the Kaldor-
                                                 
 
13 See previous section on emissions and their impact. For further literature on the relationship between 
traffic aspects and health see van Benthem (2015), p. 55 who provides an overview of seminal works.  
14 However, studies researching traffic and fetal health in general do exist (see Footnote 13).  
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Hicks Criterion (KH) is applied to do so. It is a decision rule stating that a policy should 
be adopted only if the beneficiaries could fully compensate the “losers” of the measure 
and would still be better off (see Boardman et al., 2014, p.32). This is fulfilled automati-
cally when positive social net benefits are obtained:  
  
𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠 =  𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠 −  𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 >  0 [1] 
 
This simple equation introduces the perspective of normative welfare economics, which 
is taken in this CBA. If [1] holds, a policy is supported and the measure under consider-
ation is potentially Pareto improving, which means that society shifts closer towards Pa-
reto efficiency. As a major concept in welfare economics, the Pareto optimum describes 
an allocation in which no one can be made better off without making at least one person 
worse off (see e.g. Boardman et al., 2014).  
In the case of speed, a Pareto efficient solution and thus optimal welfare, would be 
reached if all drivers were to travel at the particular speed that maximizes net benefits (or 
minimizes the cost of travel) (see Elvik, 2010, p.196). However, external effects,15 erro-
neous accident risk perceptions and heterogeneous speed preferences are good reasons to 
believe that the individual choice of driving speed is likely to be inefficient from a soci-
ety´s point of view. These “market imperfections” have often justified a policy interven-
tion by means of limiting driving speeds (see Elvik, 2010, p.197). 
It can make sense for the CBA to disentangle the external effects from the behavior 
change attributable to the policy impacts.16 However, the primary goal is to figure out the 
social costs (benefits) which are defined as the sum of private and external costs (benefits) 
(see Brenck et al., 2016, p.402). Thus, it holds that:  
 
𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 =  𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 +  𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 [2] 
 
To measure these social costs and benefits Boardman et al. (2014) have established an 
analytical framework consisting of a stepwise procedure to structure the CBA process. I 
adopt their stages for the workflow in this thesis. TABLE 3–1 lists the consecutive steps 
and maps them with the chapters and research questions in this thesis. Thus, the table 
represents the framework of the subsequent analysis.  
 
                                                 
 
15 External Effects of automotive use and adequate internalization strategies have been laid out extensively 
in Brenck et al. (2016), Parry et al. (2007). An introduction to external effects in the context of CBA can 
be found in Mishan and Quah (2007) and is generally covered by any introductory (micro-) economic text-
book. 
16 I will classify the calculated results in this thesis as private or external in Chapter 8.1.  
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TABLE 3–1: MAJOR STEPS IN THE CBA 




1.  Specify the set of alternative projects. 4 
R1 
2. Decide whose benefits and costs count  
(Standing). 
4 
3. Identify and catalogue the impact categories.  2 & 5 
4. Predict the impacts quantitatively. 6 R2 
5. Monetize all impacts. 7 
R3 
6. Compute the value of each alternative. 8 
7. Perform sensitivity analysis. 8 
8. Make a recommendation. 9 
Source: Own table based on Boardman et al. (2014), p. 6, aligned with the structure of this work.  
 
With this short wrap up on the purpose of CBA and its underlying welfare economic 
perspective in mind, the next chapter dives right into the analysis of a general speed limit 
policy for passenger cars on German highways.  
4 SUBJECT AND STANDING 
Kicking off the exploration, one has to define how the specific policy under consideration 
– the subject of analysis – is designed. What does the project look like and which alter-
natives are there?  
It is advantageous to begin with the counterfactual to characterize the policy’s setting. 
The counterfactual can be understood as the baseline option to compare the analysis re-
sults to, which is the project or policy that would be displaced when deciding in favor of 
the project under evaluation (see Boardman et al., 2014, p. 7). In this CBA, the status-quo 
shall serve this purpose.  
Today, any vehicle is allowed to use the German highway system, provided its engine is 
capable of accelerating to at least 60 km/h. These roads, known as “Autobahn”, are lim-
ited access roads with a minimum of two lanes per direction and are equipped with a 
median construction facility to divide the directions.17 On these roads, there exists a speed 
recommendation of 130 km/h but no mandatory speed limit per se. There do nevertheless 
exist speed limits for certain reasons. Essentially, these reasons are, when highway sec-
tions in have proven to be accident-prone the past or if residents shall be protected from 
                                                 
 
17 As an illustration APPENDIX 1 shows a real-world location plan as well as the cross section for a highway 
section in North Rhine-Westphalia, which was obtained from the state’s highway administration during the 
data collection process.   
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noise. The latest official figures on the share of highways without a limit stems from a 
2015 survey across states conducted by the Bundesanstalt für Straßenwesen (BASt); the 
federal highway research institute. It suggests that 70.4% of German highways remain 
without any speed restriction (see Kollmus et al., 2017, p. 4). The authors note that they 
can only present aggregated figures relative to the total highway system. This is because 
“due to the political weight of the discussion about a general speed limit on federal high-
ways, the states linked the provision of data [on the sections with/without limits] to the 
condition that it is […] not being handed over to third parties” (see Kollmus et al., 2017, 
p.2). The remaining 29.6% of the overall 25,767 highway kilometer 18 are subject to either 
a static (≈ 21%) or a variable speed limit system19 (≈ 9%) (see Kollmus et al., 2017, p.4). 
Additionally, sections may be restricted temporarily when construction works are in 
place.  
For the roughly 70% of unrestricted highways, §18 of the German road traffic act 
(Straßenverkehrsordnung; StVO) imposes a couple of exceptions, which in effect leave 
just three vehicle categories untouched when it comes to the free choice of speed. The 
vehicle types that can freely choose their speeds on the respective sections are light duty 
vehicles (≤ 3.5 t), passenger cars and motorcycles without a trailer. Over the past years, 
passenger cars consistently accounted for more than 85% of the daily traffic on highways 
(see BMVI, 2017, p.109). Accordingly, the analysis will focus on this vehicle category. 
 
The hypothetical policy considered at the core of this research is the introduction of a 
general, static and permanent speed limit for passenger cars on highways in Germany. 
Taking the outlined status quo as a reference, which is assumed to continue alternatively 
to the project, this means:  
1. General: the limit applies to any highway user and any vehicle category if the 
highway section is not yet regulated differently. As long as the speed limit is set 
to a level above 100 km/h, which is very likely to be a reasonable constraint when 
comparing with maximum speed laws in Europe, this effectively targets only the 
vehicle categories named above.20 
                                                 
 
18 Measured as distance km, meaning that a one km highway section with two travel directions is being 
counted as two distance km.  
19 Variable or dynamic speed limit systems allow for adaptation of limits to current traffic and weather 
conditions, usually by means of flexible LED- traffic signs. This adaptation to the current situations means 
that the posted speed limit is constantly updated based on traffic and weather information such that there 
exists repercussions in both directions between speed limits and traffic situation. This imposes challenges 
to the statistical analysis of such speed limit measures. 
20 APPENDIX 2 lists speed limits in several European countries. It can be seen that with the exception of 
Norway all countries in the list have a speed limit on motorways above 100 km/h. 
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2. Static: the highway sections without a speed restriction would either be prepared 
with commonly used metal traffic signs, or no signs would be set up at all. They 
are not variable in a sense that they depend on the current traffic situations.  
3. Permanent: the speed limits are implemented and in force permanently and the 
regulation is not intended to be amended at a certain point in time.  
 
Due to the hypothetical nature of the policy, this work embodies an ex ante CBA. In-
nately, such an analysis is subject to uncertainty, as it is inevitable to estimate and value 
the expected effects of the policy under reasonable assumptions.   
One of the first necessary assumptions is to determine whose benefits and costs should 
count in the socio-economic evaluation (see Boardman et al., 2014, p.7). The decision for 
or against a speed limit is clearly one to be taken by the federal government of Germany, 
which in turn, can plausibly be viewed as a social planner. Their primary concern is often 
with the people of their respective jurisdictions. However, in this case standing shall be 
given to every highway user irrespective of his or her nationality. This is because some 
of the effects, for example, CO2 emissions classify as global impacts. An ethical argument 
is also, that giving standing to domestic people only would imply that a foreigner who 
dies on German highways is not included in the welfare considerations. Hence, the study 
will quantify and monetize the impacts that occur to all individuals using the German 
highway system.21 
5 IDENTIFYING COSTS AND BENEFITS 
Now that the project has been defined and the group with standing in the CBA is deter-
mined, it is turned towards the identification of the impact categories. Boardman et al. 
(2014) state that impacts can be both outputs from a project as well as inputs to it, and 
may contribute to either the cost, benefits or to both sides of the calculation. They note 
that an impact needs to exert a cause-and-effect relationship of a projects’ outcome on the 
utility of humans with standing. If impacts only affect the welfare of people without stand-
ing in the CBA, they are not to be counted. As a last remark they advise the analyst to 
recall that impacts may be a benefit for a (sub-) group of the population with standing but 
can simultaneously constitute a cost for another (see Boardman et al., 2014, p.8ff).22  
                                                 
 
21 Figures by Lensing (2010) suggest that about 90% of daily vehicle kilometers on German highways are 
driven by domestic vehicles anyway. Thus, giving standing to all road users is not far away from the do-
mestic perspective.   
22 Applied to the present case a conceivable example for this phenomenon is that a speed limit restricts the 
choice of speed, which may cause welfare losses to the group of people enjoying a fast ride on a highway. 
Conversely, more conservative drivers could gain a social benefit from feeling safer on the highway if there 
are no (or at least less) cars traveling at extreme speeds.  
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Cataloguing impacts is a critical task as the selection will alter the outcome of the analy-
sis. In some cases, the selection may have the potential to decide about whether a project 
has positive or negative net benefits – it can turn a “do” into a “don’t do” decision and 
vice versa.  
The list of imaginable impacts from a speed limit change is long. The literature review in 
section 2 already provides an identification of broad impact categories. Since they are 
based on a wide-ranging foundation of academic works, these categories provide are a 
good starting point. Below the four pillars are recalled:  
 
(1) Travel speed  
(2) Accidents  
(3) Air Pollution 
(4) Health from air pollution 
 
These impacts do not necessarily represent direct benefits or costs and include more than 
a single cost or benefit to society. For example, reduced travel speed itself is mostly not 
regarded as a direct cost but increased travel time from driving slower will usually be.  
From these categories, one can drill down the most relevant quantifiable items for the 
present CBA, which are listed in TABLE 5–1.  
Travel time and fuel consumption directly link to travel speed and are chosen as the core 
benefit or cost item that is being affected by this impact category. They classify as purely 
private since they fully accrue to the individual driver. Accidents are split into fatalities, 
severe injuries and light injuries, where it is the number of people harmed, that shall con-
tribute partly to private, partly to social costs or benefits. Finally, the category air pollu-
tion is viewed in two dimensions to quantify, namely global and local emissions, as has 
been examined in the literature review. Both will be treated as external cost.  
It is noteworthy, that the list does not contain changes in health impacts from pollutant 
emissions. Since I use an estimate of the social cost of emissions in the valuation section, 
I do not estimate the impacts on health from pollution directly. To avoid double counting, 
this impact is implicitly incorporated in the social cost of emission changes. 
The items listed are intuitively plausible and match with the majority of aspects listed by 
(see Elvik, 2001, p.15) who discusses items that are generally considered in CBA for road 
investment projects in Norway. Thus, by basing the study on impact categories and their 
corresponding subcategories gathered from well-known literature, the selection of the 
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efit/ Cost Items  
Description Classifica-
tion 
Travel Speed Travel Time Change in time needed to 




Change in fuel when traveling 
at altered speed. 
Private 












Air Pollution Local air pollu-
tion  
 






Change in emissions of global 
pollutant CO2.  
External  
Note: The table lists the core impact categories as identified within the literature review and as-
signs relevant quantifiable items for the CBA. The Items are classified as private or external  
Source: Own table. 
 
The reader may potentially think of other impacts that could be of social interest. Of 
course, a CBA can impossibly capture all conceivable effects of a policy measure but 
should aim at operationalizing those with the highest expected effect or relevance. How-
ever, I discuss other benefits/cost categories in the sensitivity analysis to see how they 
would alter the decision.  
6 PREDICTING IMPACTS  
The previous section provided an answer towards the first research question (R1) of this 
thesis. A review of previous highway research was used to assemble a normative collec-
tion of the most relevant factors to be included in speed limit studies (TABLE 5–1). This 
chapter deals with R2, elaborating on the question, how a speed limit would change the 
identified benefit and cost items. In section 6.1 the study design and key backgrounds of 
the analysis are presented, whereas the remaining sections of this chapter estimate the 
direction and magnitude of change for each impact.  
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6.1 Study Design, Strategy and Data 
6.1.1 Study Design  
Given that any speed limit on highways in Germany is due to certain reasons, such as 
higher danger of an accident, analyses within the country may be criticized to suffer from 
selection issues. The mere presence of a speed limit is already caused by certain charac-
teristics of the road section in question. In this sense, an incomparability of limited and 
unlimited sections within the country arises. Thus, it has to be expected that speed limits 
are endogenous when estimating their impact on the key variables such as travel speed.  
In order to overcome this challenge, the empirical approach used in this thesis takes ad-
vantage of the fact that Germany is located in continental Europe. The country is sur-
rounded by neighboring countries, all of which have implemented a general speed limit 
on high-speed roads. The idea is to identify German highway sections that do not underlie 
a speed limit but cross a federal border from where on they are subject to the respective 
limit of the neighboring country. In this way, a natural experiment can be constructed.  
This is an advantageous approach as the possibility of field experiments, i.e. randomly 
varying speed limits on a certain highway section, is basically not feasible. In this case, 
natural experiments are a suitable tool to target the research problem. One can think of 
the study design as a spatial before-after case study. The approach makes use of what will 
be called the “intra-highway” differentials – changes of a given variable between the do-
mestic (Germany) and foreign (Netherlands) part of a particular cross-border highway. 
Thus, the identifying assumption is that the impact variables observed in Germany would 
converge to the same values measured on the foreign part of the same highway, if Ger-
many was to adopt the same speed limit policy as in the foreign country.  
To my knowledge, this method is fairly new and has not yet been used in the literature. 
The work therefore also adds to the transport research literature inasmuch as the identifi-
cation strategy can potentially serve other research endeavors.  
From a methodological point of view, the differences will be estimated using a descriptive 
comparison of the wide-ranging data collected (see 6.1.4). Initially, a regression design 
was planned, however, generating a reasonable set of control variables to obtain valid 
results was unfeasible within the scope of this thesis.  
In theory, to operationalize the idea, one would want to find a long highway section, 
divided in the middle by a federal border. Ideally, the German part would be free of any 
speed limits while the foreign counterpart would be consequently restricted by the general 
speed limit of the neighboring country. Unfortunately, such a stylized highway does not 
exist in reality. Several steps and a lot of effort of this work were put into the mere iden-
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Identification of highways 
First, I composed a list of all neighboring countries of Germany. I eliminated those, which 
were either expected not to have comparable highway standards to Germany or those, 
where data collection and availability was expected to be cumbersome due to language 
barriers or differing standards (e.g. Czech Republic and Poland). Second, I assembled a 
list of all highways passing a border to the remaining countries as well as the correspond-
ing federal states and the highway administrations in charge. Third, I conducted a mail-
survey among the states highway administrations to clarify the availability of actual driv-
ing speed data as well as information about installed speed limits on the roads in question. 
This was necessary, because previous research efforts revealed that there exists no insti-
tution in Germany, which centrally collects these data.23   
As a fourth step, it was necessary to reduce the number of highways for which data was 
available to a subset of roads with a high share of unlimited sections in the border region. 
After clarifying the availability of similar data within the foreign countries, a couple of 
highways remained, mostly leading from Germany into the Netherlands.24 
As a final step towards the identification of suitable highways for the analysis, I controlled 
the comparability of the domestic and foreign part of the highways with respect to con-
struction details and basic road geometry. Using publicly available online applications 
and geographical information systems (GIS), I constructed elevations profiles, a measure 
of curvature and checked for the number of lanes. 
Finally, I identified two highways, which stand the list of requirements and are suitable 
for the analysis. Both lead from the state of North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) to the Neth-
erlands. On Dutch highways, the general speed limit currently is 130km/h. It was raised 
from 120 km/h by Melanie Schultz van Haegen, the former Minister of Infrastructure and 
the Environment, in September 2012. On June 26th 2012, she informed the House of Rep-
resentatives in a chamber letter about the results of her previously conducted road exper-
iments and presented the final picture of changes in the highway net (see Ministerie van 
Infrastructuur en Milieu, 2012). These experiments were concerned with potential issues 
such as NO2 concentrations and traffic safety. The results broadly supported the feasibil-
ity of higher speed limits on 48% of the Dutch highway net. Under the motto “From A to 
better” she ran a cross-media communications campaign to inform the public about the 
policy amendment and revised the old traffic signs on affected roads (see Ministerie van 
                                                 
 
23 See APPENDIX 4 
24 Initially, another highway to Austria was considered. Its inclusion in the analysis would have been a good 
check for robustness. Unfortunately, data on the German part turned out to be insufficient. However, the 
Austrian highway institute ASFINAG quickly provided data on driving speeds and traffic intensities and 
may be a good partner for future research efforts.  
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Infrastructuur en Milieu, 2012).25 The speed limit of 130 km/h currently valid in the Neth-
erlands is an interesting scenario to compare the German situation with. As the recom-
mended speed in Germany is the exact same level, it provides an opportunity to analyze 
which impacts are to be expected if this regulation was a binding limit rather than a mere 
recommendation.  
 
6.1.2 The analyzed highways 
The core characteristics of the two highways analyzed in this work are summarized in 
Table 6–1. The first highway is the road number A61 in Germany which I label “H1G”, 
denoting the German part of Highway 1.26 Its Dutch extension is highway number 73 in 
the Netherlands (labeled H1N accordingly).27 The second highway is the A3 (H2G) for the 
German part and its number changes to A12 (H2N) in the Netherlands.  
I was able to define the road segments, such that they ensure a comparable length for 
both, the domestic (totaling 144 km over both German sections) and foreign (147 km) 
parts. The overall length of the selected sections adds up to roughly 290 km (or 580 di-
rection-km). Except for the Dutch H2N, all roads consistently have four lanes. The H2N 
has a few segments on which there are six lanes, which is not problematic since all rele-
vant sections with a posted speed limit of 130 km/h have four lanes. North Rhine-West-
phalia and the Netherlands are also well suitable for the analysis because the land in the 
region is essentially flat. To support this fact, I present descriptive statistics on the slope 
of all highways in APPENDIX 5. I constructed the elevation statistics using official geo-
information web applications.28 The highway sections were cut into pieces of 1000m, for 
each of which I calculate the slope.29 The average absolute slopes vary between 0.23% - 
0.45% (see TABLE 6–1 and APPENDIX 5). This means that across all 1000m pieces per 
highway, the height differential was on average 2.3 to 4.5m. Put simply, this is essentially 
flat. The data underpins the statement of a road planner from the highway administration 
in NRW, who stated that slopes > |1,5%| are not to be expected in the area. One exception 
to this is the maximum incline of roughly 2% observed on H2G. However, this is still a 
low value and a rare exception (see Boxplot in APPENDIX 5), which could also be caused 
by minor inaccuracy of the constructed elevation profile.  
                                                 
 
25 APPENDIX 3 shows the map with the resulting speed limits after the amendment, which was attached as 
additional material in the chamber letter by the minister. I indicate the highways covered in the present 
work. 
26 The labeling is not intended to provide a ranking in any sense. 
27 In fact, a short segment, which connects the A73 and the A61 in the border region of the Netherlands, 
belongs to highway number 74 but I do not include data on this segment.  
28 These applications are Geoportal NRW and Actueel Hoogte Bestand Nederland. 
29 Thus, for a 100 km stretch of highway, an equal number of individual slopes would be calculated. Then 
the descriptive statistics over these values are presented.  
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In the absence of noticeable mountains, roads do not need to be adapted to maneuver 
through difficult terrain but can be built relatively straight. Intentionally, highways are 
not constructed as a straight line to prevent fatiguing travelers. However, the curves on 
the chosen sections are moderate. As a basic measure of geometry, I calculated the ratio 
of the highway length to the linear distance of its start and ending point. The values range 
from 1.07 to 1.2, which describes that the highways are 7%-20% longer than the linear 
connection would have been. From TABLE 6–1 it comes out that the foreign highways are 
slightly more “curvy” than their German counterparts. However, given the moderate dif-
ferences, it seems reasonable to assume this not to invalidate the general comparability 
of the sections.  
To get a better impression of the highways selected, I visualize them in a map, highlight-
ing their location and major cities around (FIGURE 6-1). It already shows the speed meas-
urement stations used in the analysis, which will be explained in detail in section 6.1.4.  
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TABLE 6–1: THE ANALYZED HIGHWAYS 
 Highway 1 Highway 2 
Label H1G H1N H2G H2N 
Country Germany Netherlands Germany Netherlands 
Highway Number A61 A73 A3 A12 
Highway km* 0 – 79 39 – 109 0 – 65 149 – 72 
Length of section** 158 km 140 km 130 km 154 km 
% of no (domestic) or 
general speed limit 
(foreign) 
71% 82% 95% 15.04% (day) 
58.19% (night) 
Ratio of Road length 




Lanes per direction 4 4 4 4 (partly 6) 



















0.00% / 1.00% 
Note: The table provides an overview of the key facts of the highways analyzed in the thesis.  
* In each column, the first number indicates the point at the border and the second marks the end of the relevant section within the country. ** Measured 
as distance km, i.e. counting the highway length for both directions. 
Source: Own table and calculations. Data on speed limits according to 6.1.3. Ratio of road length as well as no. of lanes obtained from analysis within GIS 
application. Slope statistics obtained from elevation profiles constructed using official public geographic web applications: Geoportal NRW and Actueel 
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Figure 6-1: Selected Highway sections between Germany and the Netherlands including speed stations and major cities.  
Source: Own illustration. Shapefiles for map creation were collected from Nationale Databank Wegverkeersgegevens” (NDW), 
www.geoportal.de and www.geofabrik.de. Speed station locations are coded based on location coordinates provided by the 
respective speed station operator. Germany (dark grey filling) and the Netherlands (light grey filling).   
N 
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Another aspect when comparing two highway sections is the traffic demand on the ana-
lyzed roads. If one highway was significantly more used than the other, intra-highway 
differences between domestic and foreign sections may be driven by traffic intensity. To 
account for this, average annual daily traffic (AADT) is a central variable employed in 
traffic models. It is calculated as the annual average of vehicles passing a given highway 
measurement point each day for a given year (see Leduc, 2008, p.9). Based on the col-
lected data for this thesis (see 6.1.4) I estimate the AADT for the German and Dutch part 
of both highways.30 Over the years 2015-2017 the average vehicles per day on H2G (H1G) 
were 48,535 (41,301) compared to 47,708 (47,099) on the Dutch H2N (H1N). This is a 
desirable estimate, since all highways (with a slight deviation on H1G) are close to the 
German average daily traffic, which was at 48,800 in 2014 (see BMVI, 2017, p.106). 
These figures reassure that I do not analyze highways with an unusual traffic density.  
Moreover, the estimates show that the country differences in daily traffic are not of much 
concern. For Highway 2 the absolute difference in AADT is merely 827 vehicles. On 
Highway 1 the same difference amounts to a larger but still not critical 5799 vehicles per 
day.31 For the sake of the argument made, namely, that traffic density is in a comparable 
range on each of the two roads, the latter figure is not perfect but acceptable.  
Having obtained these numbers it is also possible to provide an estimate of the annual 
vehicle kilometers traveled per section. This can be easily computed by  
 
 
𝑣𝑘𝑚𝐻𝑐 = 𝐴𝐴𝐷𝑇𝐻𝑐 ∙ 365 ∙ 𝑙𝐻𝑐   [3] 
Where vkm= estimate of annual vehicle kilometers per year 
Hc= Highway section in country c 
AADT = Average annual daily traffic 
l= length of highway  
 
(see Scholz, Schmallowsky, & Wauer, 2007, p17).   
  
The vkm describe a statistical estimate of the total vehicle kilometers driven on average 
per year for a given highway. Thereby the estimate constitutes an important information 
as some input factors (e.g. accidents) need to be scaled by some measure of highway 
                                                 
 
30 See APPENDIX 6 for calculations.  
31 The figure may appear large at first. However, a regular four-lane highway with no speed limit in Ger-
many has a capacity of around 3400 vehicles/h (see Scholz, T., Schmallowsky, A., & Wauer, T (2007), p. 
20) and many highways reach daily traffic of more than 100,000 vehicles. 5799 vehicles/day translate into 
241 vehicles/h, which does not affect traffic flow very significantly.  
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usage to maintain comparability. TABLE 6–2 comprises the estimates for the vkm per sec-
tion. As the inputs to the calculation are the specific length of a road segment and the 
measure of AADT, which have been shown to be relatively similar across the highways, 
also the vehicle kilometers traveled lay in a narrow bandwidth. The estimates will for 
example be used in the valuation of accidents and provide a final important estimate for 
describing the highways. The next section finalizes the picture and looks at the overview 
of speed limits in more detail.  
 
TABLE 6–2: ESTIMATES OF MEAN ANNUAL VEHICLE KILOMETERS TRAVELED  
PER HIGHWAY SECTION. 
 
Unit H1G H1N H2G H2N 





15,074,865 17,191,135 17,715,275 17,413,420 
Length of Highway km 79 70 65 77 




1,190,914,335 1,203,379,450 1,151,492,875 1,340,833,340 
Source: Own Table and calculations. The underlying speed data is described in section 6.1.4. Highway length was 
measured in GIS application (identically to values in TABLE 6–1). 
 
6.1.3 Speed Limits on the analyzed highways 
To evaluate the impact of speed limit differences, it is indispensable to get a good idea of 
the distribution of speed limits on the highways in question. Speed limits are subject to 
constant changes in several dimensions. Amongst other scenarios, they can be differenti-
ated by time of the day, vehicle classes or driving direction; they are installed when con-
struction works are going on or when the road surface is damaged. Accounting for all 
potential issues is a tedious exercise even for a single highway and country. As a realistic 
approximation and consistent with the project approach, I concentrate on the permanent 
speed limits posted on the sections.32  
For North Rhine-Westphalia, I received an overview of the posted speed limits by high-
way km for 2016 and 2017. The information was provided by the Ministry of Transport 
of the federal state of North Rhine-Westphalia („Ministerium für Verkehr des Landes 
Nordrhein-Westfalen“). Fortunately, the relevant highway sections did not change over 
the years. The speed limits for the Dutch highways were obtained from a GIS-shapefile 
                                                 
 
32 As personal correspondence with the highway authorities of NRW revealed, an overview of short-term 
speed limits (e.g. for construction sites) is neither existing nor practicable to maintain. Often, several au-
thorities are responsible for operating and maintaining certain sections of the same highway and consoli-
dated information is not available.   
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that is published in the open data portal of the national database of road traffic data “Na-
tionale Databank Wegverkeersgegevens” (NDW).33 As this data expresses the current 
state, I compared it to the map available from the 2012 chamber letter mentioned in 6.1.1, 
which sketches the same picture. Thus, based on the consonance of 2012 and current 
speed limits, I assume that permanent speed limits between the amendment of the national 
maximum speeds in Sep 2012 and the time of writing this thesis did not experience rele-
vant changes.  
 
FIGURE 6-2 depicts the distribution of speed limits on the selected roads. The largest parts 
of the German highways have no posted speed limit (71%/ 95% on H1G/H2G). In the Neth-
erlands, H1N is subject to the general speed limit of 130 km/h over 82% of the defined 
road. Only H2N is somewhat more variable. During the day (6 am to 7 pm) the highest 
share is limited to 120 km/h (72%) which falls to 29% in the remaining hours of the day 
due to time differentiation. Hence, at night, on 58% of the highway vehicles are allowed 
to travel at 130 km/h. I deal with this exception by only including data from these stations 
and time periods, where there was a 130 km/h limit posted. The description of the data 
and its sources follows in the next section.    
 
                                                 
 





























130 120 100 no
limit
130 120 100 130 120 100 130 120 100
H1G H2G H1N H2N
Relative Share of posted Speed Limits per Highway
Relative Share of speed limit
(% of total section)
Relative Share of speed limit
(% of total section; nighttime)
Figure 6-2: Distribution of posted speed limits on the analyzed highways (km/h). Source: Own calculations and illus-
tration based on data from „Nationale Databank Wegverkeersgegevens” (Netherlands) and the Ministry of 
Transport of the federal state of North Rhine-Westphalia (Germany). 
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6.1.4 Data  
Collecting and assembling data was a major task of this thesis. The aim was to collect 
data on travel speeds and accidents specifically pinned down to the selected highway parts 
for both countries. This section explains what data is used for the analysis and where it is 
obtained from. The overview is structured by category. In the impact estimation parts 
hereafter, the details on the descriptive statistics are laid out (section 6.2 - 6.4).  
 
Travel speed data 
The data on travel speeds was collected from inductive loops placed under the road sur-
face. These loops count the number of vehicles passing the station, categorize them by 
size and summarize the results for selectable time intervals. Some of these stations also 
measure travel speeds of the individual vehicles in each category and provide mean 
speeds at the same level of aggregation. For the analysis, I use hourly data on speeds and 
vehicles for passenger cars in the years 2015-2017. In Germany, the data was provided 
by the state’s highway administration, called “Straßen NRW”. For the Netherlands, the 
data stems from the NDW Database. Since the publicly available online version only 
provides highly aggregated figures, the NDW equipped me with a user account to their 
remotely accessible detailed database.  
The included stations had to fulfill several requirements to ensure suitable and compara-
ble data.  
1. Data is available for the full time span in both countries. 
2. Stations are located on the main carriageway (no side arms, acceleration 
lanes, etc.) 
3. The station is an induction loop and not any other type of speed measurement 
instrument (e.g. infrared measurement sites).  
4. The induction loop measures traffic speeds and intensities. Not only one of 
these components. 
5. The stations have a vehicle classification available, which allows for compar-
ison. The German data differentiates passenger cars and trucks. In the Neth-
erlands the stations differ in their categorizations. I could only use stations 
with a certain three-type classification in order to observe a category for pas-
senger cars that is comparable to the German data. The Dutch category chosen 
is defined as all vehicles under a length of 5.6m, which effectively corre-
sponds to passenger cars.34 significantly 
                                                 
 
34 One has to abstract from motorcycles which may fall into this category as well. However, their share on 
highways is so low, that this abstraction is not expected to bias the data.   
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6. The station provides the arithmetic means of travel speeds. Especially in the 
Netherlands, several stations transmit harmonic means of the hourly data, 
which would lead to incomparability to the German figures as they use arith-
metic averages.  
These requirements considerably reduced the number of available stations leaving me 
with 91 suitable speed measurement stations. These are distributed across the highway as 
seen in TABLE 6–3.  
 
TABLE 6–3: NUMBER OF SPEED MEASUREMENT STATIONS AND SPEED AND VEHICLE IN-
TENSITY OBSERVATIONS BY HIGHWAY (2015-2017). 
 H1G H2G H1N H2N 
Number of speed  
stations 
12 18 14 47 
Total number of hourly ob-
servations  
532,317 904,108 683,826 1,262,448 
Source: own table based on collected speed data as described above. 
 
In Germany, these stations measure both lanes per direction, while in the Netherlands 
there exist different stations, some of which measure only one lane while others include 
two lanes per direction. All stations provide the driving direction, the date, hour, and the 
count of all vehicles passing a certain station. Finally, I assigned the corresponding speed 
limit to each station based on my information of posted permanent limits. 
  
Accident Data 
There are two margins one can adjust to obtain a reasonable number of accident observa-
tions. The first is the road length, which is fixed in my study. The second is the time 
horizon included. Thus, for the accident data I opt for a longer period, namely 2005 to 
2016. 
For the state of North Rhine-Westphalia, I collected accident data from the state’s road 
administration.35 The organization provided the accidents tailored to the precise road seg-
ments as defined in my request and limited to accidents on the main-carriageway only. 
This is necessary since (consistent with the speed data) accidents in the side arms etc. are 
disturbing when analyzing the speed limits on the main road. The data draws on police 
records taken on-site of a particular accident and contains detailed information for every 
                                                 
 
35 Originally, I obtained data for all years, the highway administration was able to provide at the time of 
my request, namely 2003 to 2017. After aligning the data with the Netherlands, I dropped the years 2003, 
2004 and 2017 since they are not available for the foreign highway parts.  
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recorded accident on the highway sections. A single accident entry contains a large num-
ber of variables that can be used for further analysis (e.g. road condition, driver charac-
teristics etc.). Each accident is classified into severity categories: deadly accident, acci-
dent with at least one severe injury, accident with at least one light injury, and two cate-
gories for accidents with property damage only (one separated if drugs/alcohol were in-
volved). I ignore the latter because in 2008 the ministry of the interior initially obliged 
police officers to record light property damage accidents, which leads to underreporting 
in the previous periods.36 However, the property damage only accidents will be elaborated 
on in the sensitivity analysis.  
 
TABLE 6–4: DEFINITIONS OF ACCIDENT SEVERITY CATEGORIES  
IN GERMANY AND THE NETHERLANDS. 
 Germany  Netherlands 
Road  
fatality 
Road death, which occurs within 30 days of 
a road crash. 
Death resulting from a road crash 
within 30 days of the crash. 
Seriously in-
jured 
Any person immediately taken to hospital 
after a road crash for inpatient treatment of 
at least 24 hours. 
Person admitted to hospital for an in-
jury with a Maximum Abbreviated In-
jury Score of two or more (MAIS2+). 
Slightly in-
jured 
Any other person injured in a road crash. Other injuries, not admitted or admit-
ted to hospital with a maximum 
Abbreviated Injury Scale score of one 
(MAIS1). 
Source: own table based on ITF (2017). 
 
For the foreign counterparts I started with a large data set called “Accidents and Network” 
which is provided by the “Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat Rijkswaterstaat”.37 Con-
sistent with the German data, the accident information stems from police records taken 
on-site of a particular accident.38 In the Netherlands, each accident is linked to the digital 
road network (national roads database file). The files list all accidents recorded in a given 
year and are intended explicitly to provide a basis for policy evaluation and other research. 
Because the data processing changed in 2004, I ignore earlier data. Thus, my data set 
covers the years 2005 to 2016.  
                                                 
 
36 This was already found by Manner and Wünsch-Ziegler (2013) and I could verify this information during 
my personal correspondence with state officials.  
37 The data is available under https://www.rijkswaterstaat.nl/apps/geoservices/geodata/dmc/bron/ (last 
checked: 12.08.2018).   
38 This fact also implies that accidents that are not registered by the police do not enter the statistic. This 
gives rise to potential issues of different rates of unknown cases in the two countries, which I can´t observe. 
However, for the severe categories such as fatal and severe accidents these figures are expected to be mar-
ginal.  
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Rijkwaterstaat provides the raw data sets on an annual basis. Each data set consists of 
several separate files structured by the core data on the accidents itself, their respective 
involvements and the current road network in each year. A large shapefile for use in ge-
ographical information systems is provided within each year. Because I only analyze 
parts of the two highways, it was necessary to determine the identical highway sections 
as used for the speed data. Unfortunately, due to changes in the network, the section IDs 
are not stable over time. Therefore, I use each year´s shapefiles to reduce the road network 
information to the same relevant sections. After excluding all sections that are not the 
main carriageway I extracted the year-specific highway section IDs. This allows me to 
link the accident files (stored in separate spreadsheets) to the identified section IDs. With 
this procedure, it was possible to assemble the accidents, which have taken place on the 
exact defined roads in a given year.  
After assembling the section-specific accidents for both countries, I aligned the included 
variables whenever possible. Important for the study here is the alignment of the severity 
category variable. The definitions for the accidents with person damage are shown in 
TABLE 6–4. The Netherlands defines its classification based on the maximum abbreviated 
injury score (MAIS) which was developed by the American Association for the Advance-
ment of Automotive Medicine in the USA. The AIS classifies injuries on a scale from 0 
(no injury) to 6 (currently untreatable).39 A direct translation of the German accident sta-
tistics to the AIS score applied in the Dutch definitions is not available (see Baum et al., 
2011, p. 14). However, it is clear that the fatal crashes are subject to the same definition. 
The two injury categories are more cumbersome to align, but there is information allow-
ing to infer from.  
For an injury to be classified as “severe” in the German statistic, it is linked to the condi-
tion that the person is hospitalized for at least 24 hours. Now in ITF (2017) the authors 
use extrapolated data from the Hannover and Dresden area where they are able to come 
up with some estimates of serious injuries in 2015 including a MAIS score. They note 
that “in 2015, 15 442 or 22.8% of all hospitalized road crash casualties [in Germany] had 
a MAIS of 3 or above“ (see ITF, 2017, p.193). This implies that the remaining share of 
hospitalized casualties has had a MAIS below this value. Since the MAIS 1 is classified 
as “minor” injuries and the lower category 0 applies to unhurt persons, it can reasonably 
be concluded that only MAIS scores of 2 (“moderate”) or above contribute to the category 
of severe accidents in Germany as well. At a minimum, potential differences in the defi-
nitions can be expected to be inconsequential for the analysis.  
Finally, it may be noted that the Netherlands data has one category for property damage 
accidents, which applies if an accident simply did not have any person hurt. On the other 
                                                 
 
39 Definitions used here come from Haasper et al. (2010)  
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hand, in Germany there were three categories for property damage only accidents (serious 
property damage, light property damage, property damage and alcohol/drugs involved). I 
merged these categories to generate consistency with the Dutch data.  
6.2 Impact of a general speed limit on travel speed 
The central question to be answered in this section is: How would travel speed change if 
there was a speed limit introduced on German highways? It has become common practice 
to review three main performance measures, namely mean speeds, 85th percentile speeds 
and measures of speed variance.40  
For the present case study, one may expect that all three measures are lower in the Neth-
erlands, since a speed limit introduces a constraint on drivers speed choice. Furthermore, 
the reduction in 85th percentile speeds may be more pronounced than the decrease in mean 
due to less excessive top speeds, which would underline a more homogenous traffic flow. 
From these theoretical thoughts, I derive the following hypothesis to analyze empirically 
in this section: 
1. A speed limit on German highways reduces average travel speeds.  
2. A speed limit on German highways homogenizes the traffic flow and reduces top 
speeds.  
I use the dataset introduced above to evaluate differences between the Dutch and German 
highways and compare the results of the two highways to each other to check for robust-
ness of the results. For the highway H2G, I restrict the data set to only these stations where 
a speed limit of 130 km/h was posted in order not to bias the analysis by the inclusion of 
differing stations.  
In TABLE 6–5 the speed observations are summarized by highway. For the years 2015-
2017 and over all stations per road, mean speeds and standard deviations are lower on the 
Dutch highways. In addition, the top speeds are more pronounced in Germany.  
                                                 
 
40 See e.g. Savolainen et al. (2014), Kockelmann (2006) Gates et al. (2015).  
 
 TABLE 6–5: SUMMARY OF HOURLY MEAN SPEED BY HIGHWAY  
DURING THE YEARS 2015-2017. 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Highway 1 H1g  518,724 121.388 13.804 1 232 
A1n 603,233 118.514 11.076 2 189 
Highway 2 H2g   904,108 123.735 16.827 1 250 
H2n  486,972 116.018 14.848 3 188 
Overall  2,513,037 120.502 14.904 1 250 
Source: own table based on speed data as described in section 6.1.4. 
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FIGURE 6-3 shows a box plot graph of the assembled speed data by highway. The median 
values are in a similar range over the highways but slightly higher for Germany when 
compared with the Dutch roads. The interquartile range and adjacent values are quite 
symmetrically arranged around the median value for each highway, implying little skew-
ness in the distribution.41 Yet, the graph shows lower variability on the Dutch highways. 
Several outliers are displayed on each highway for both lower and higher speeds than 
usual.  
 
These can be explained by traffic intensities which cause mean speeds to be lower, if 
traffic is high and lead travelers to speed up, when facing an empty road. The graph also 
reveals that the German data contains several observations of hourly mean speeds above 
200 km/h, while the maximum hourly averages measured on the Dutch roads did not 
exceed 189 km/h. This is in line with expected behavior, since higher speeds can be driven 
legally in Germany. APPENDIX 9 puts together the mean speeds and traffic intensities for 
                                                 
 
41 APPENDIX 8 plots the distributions per highway, which support a symmetric distribution around the mean 
for each highway.  
Figure 6-3: Boxplot graph of observed hourly mean speed by highway, 2015-2017. Source: own figure based on 
speed data as described in 6.1.4.  
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hours in which the speed was measured above 200 km/h and shows that top speeds are 
observed only when traffic is very low in the corresponding time span.42 
The intuitive phenomenon that speed decreases as traffic density increases and ap-
proaches zero at the maximal traffic density is called speed-density relationship.43 Often 
traffic engineers are interested in calibrating models and estimating functions for this re-
lationship, which is not within scope of this work. However, I calculate the correlations 
of mean speed and number of vehicles in a given hour for each of the highways, which 
range from -0.37 to -0.52, thus showing a medium strong negative relationship.44 Despite 
these figures being plain correlations, one may hardly argue that the direction of causality 
is such that there are more cars on the highway because people drive slower. With a high 
degree of certainty, reality is vice versa.  
TABLE 6–6 comprises descriptive statistics of the speed data and reveals further insights 
into the truly driven speeds by highway and year. Panel 1 tabulates mean speeds and 85th 
percentile speeds for the years 2015-2017. The data is averaged over all stations on a 
particular highway for a given year and the standard deviation and number of observa-
tions is reported. For H2N I restrict the stations to those, which are located in a section 
with the general limit of 130 km/h (restricted set of stations).  
Firstly, it can be noted, that yearly mean speeds do not reach the Dutch general speed 
limit of 130 km/h on any of the domestic or foreign highways. Due to the high aggregation 
level, this should not be surprising. The 85th percentile in Germany is always above 130 
km/h, which indicates that around 15% of hourly observations exceed this threshold. In 
the Netherlands, the 85th percentile speed is in no case higher than roughly 126.5 km/h. 
In addition, there are no visible time trends in the annual data. For a time period of three 
consecutive years it seems reasonable to assume no structural changes in motorization, 
improvement of vehicle safety or altered vehicle composition on the roads which one 
would need to take care about in the analysis. 
                                                 
 
42 The data included eight outliers on H1G with an average speed of more than 200 km/h where traffic 
intensities ranged between 94 and more than 400 vehicles per hour. After investigating the observations 
more closely, I decided to eliminate them due to a high chance of misreported data.  
43 See Greenshields Bruce D. (1935). 
44 See APPENDIX 10 for scatter plots of the relation between mean speed and count of vehicles per hour as 
well as a table of the correlations by highway. 
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TABLE 6–6: SUMMARY STATISTICS OF COLLECTED SPEED DATA. 
Panel 1: mean speeds and 85th percentile speeds by highway for the years 2015-2017 (km/h). 
 
 
2015       2016              2017 
 
 
Mean speed 85th percentile 
speed 
Mean speed 85th percentile 
speed 









121.777 131.208 122.099 131.641 120.299 130.560 
(13.380) (10.989) (13.848) (11.718) (14.113) (10.444) 
175,560 179,640 169,509 175,012 173,655 177,643 
       
H1N 
118.851 125.943 118.563 126.326 118.121 126.466 
(9.372) (3.876) (11.465) (5.236) (12.202) (5.612) 
201,684 213,530 203,601 207,768 197,948 200,856 








124.409 137.466 123.310 135.792 123.476 136.703 
(16.685) (11.260) (16.758) (12.735) (17.023) (12.014) 
305,802 311,020 304,906 311,742 293,400 294,630 
 
      
H2N 
115.319 122.757 115.950 124.085 116.749 125.754 
(13.906) (6.882) (15.081) (8.380) (15.445) (9.296) 
159,025 196,524 160,874 189,358 167,073 200,468 
 
      
  
Panel 2: differences in mean speeds and 85th percentile speeds as well as their respective standard deviations (km/h).      
 
H2G-H2N 
9.090 14.709 7.359 11.707 6.727 10.949 
 2.779 4.378 1.676 4.356 1.579 2.717 
  




2.926 5.265 3.537 5.315 2.178 4.094 
 4.008 7.114 2.383 6.482 1.911 4.832 
Note: Panel 1 reports mean speeds and 85th percentile speed by year and highway. Standard deviations written in brackets, the third line for each highway is the num-
ber of observations. Mean speeds are yearly averages over hourly observations while I have daily values per station for the 85th percentile which is then averaged per 
year and highway. Only stations located where the general speed limit of 130 km/h is posted are included. Panel 2 calculates differences between the German and the 
Dutch value for mean speeds and 85th percentile as well as their corresponding standard errors.  
Source: own table based on data as described in 6.1.4.  
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Throughout all years and for both highways, the mean travel speeds and the 85th percentile 
speeds are higher on the German highways relative to the Dutch parts. The differences 
are calculated in Panel 2, where I subtract the Dutch from the German figures. All values 
are positive and indicate the difference for a given year. For example, in 2016 the cars 
measured at the stations along the highway H1G were about 3.5 km/h faster than at the 
stations along the H1N. The standard deviation amongst observations for the same high-
way and year was about 2.3 km/h higher in Germany. When exploring the standard devi-
ation of the variables it becomes salient that observations vary substantially less on the 
Dutch highway sections. This would strengthen the hypothesis, that traffic flow on the 
speed constrained highway sections is more homogenous. Accordingly, 85th percentile 
speeds decrease stronger in each year than mean speeds, which additionally supports the 
presumed reduction of top speeds and alignment of the speed distribution when speed 
limits are present.  
It is of major interest to compare the differences between the two highways analyzed to 
see how robust the calculated speed declines between Germany and the Netherlands are. 
TABLE 6–6 gives a first indication, that the intra-highway differences in mean speeds 
and 85th percentiles are structurally more pronounced for Highway 2 than for Highway 1. 
For example, in 2015 on Highway 2 mean speeds have been 9.1 km/h lower in the Neth-
erlands compared to the German part of the highway, while this difference was only about 
2.9 km/h on Highway 1. For illustrational purposes, I include the calculations where I do 
not restrict the stations of H2N in APPENDIX 7.
45 With the restricted set of stations on 
Highway 2, the differences between the two highways plausibly decrease, but the general 
notion of a higher “intra-highway” speed differential on the section remains.  
Two effects account for this imbalance. On the one hand, mean speeds on H1G were struc-
turally 2-3 km/h higher than on the H2G. Second, mean speeds on H2N were structurally 
1-2 km/h above those on the H1N. Jointly, these effects go in the same direction. A plau-
sible explanation for this can be found in the more uniformly distributed speed limits 
along Highway 1 (see Figure 6-2). This creates a better traffic flow, which is evident in 
the lower standard deviations along the H1N despite higher travel speeds. For the German 
highways, this reversed relation between speeds and standard deviation cannot be found, 
but the differences in the distribution of speed limits are significantly smaller.  
                                                 
 
45 APPENDIX 7 duplicates the descriptive statistics and annual differences as calculated in TABLE 6–6 but 
includes all available stations on H2N. 
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The graph in Figure 6-4 shows differences in mean speed and 85th percentile for the anal-
ysis years. On Highway 2, I report the differences in annual averages for all Stations as 
well as the restricted set of only those observations where a speed limit of 130 km/h was 
posted, which is of better comparability to Highway 1. Clearly, the restriction of the H2N 
data leads to a lower difference in speeds caused by the effects named above. When con-
centrating on the restricted data, the highest differences are observed in 2015, where mean 
speeds (85th percentile speeds) were 9.1 km/h (14.7 km/h) lower on the Dutch Highway 
2 section compared to the German counterpart. In contrast, the lowest effects over a year 
are present in 2017 on the Highway 1 with a reduction of 2.2 km/h (4.1 km/h) in mean 
speeds (85th percentile speeds). Again, the graph nicely illustrates a certain convergence 
in the distribution of travel speeds within a given highway, as the reductions in 85th per-
centiles are consistently larger than the corresponding changes in means.  
Turning towards the intra-highway changes in standard deviations (FIGURE 6-5) the pic-
ture is similar. However, now the largest reductions are detected on Highway 1. For ex-
ample, in 2015, the observations of average speeds on the Dutch side disperse considera-
bly less around its mean than on the German share. This materializes into a 4 km/h reduc-
tion in standard deviation. At its minimum, the reduction in standard deviation of mean 
speed is calculated at 1.6 km/h (restricted data set for Highway 2 in 2017). The right-hand 
side proves that the observed decline in standard deviation around the 85th percentile 
speed is larger. This shows that the variance differential between the two countries be-
comes larger for higher speeds, which is additionally pointing towards a smoother traffic 












2015 2016 2017 2015 2016 2017
Mean speed 85th percentile speed
km
/h
Difference in Mean Speed and 85th percentile speed 
(annual averages)
H2G-H2N all Speed Stations included H2G-H2N 130 km/h only H1G-H1N
Figure 6-4: Difference in mean speed and 85th percentile speed (annual averages).Source: own figure.  
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Similar effects on the two highways would have been desirable; however, on a highway- 
specific level, the data for both highways shows the theoretically anticipated effects. To 
confirm this, I run a two-sample t-test from samples with unequal variances for each of 
the two highways on both the restricted and the unrestricted dataset. The null hypothesis 
of no differences in means is clearly rejected the at the 99% confidence level.46  
As the major interest in this analysis is the expected impact of a hypothetical limit of 130 
km/h, I stick with the restricted data. TABLE 6–7 composes the minimum and maximum 
of the observed annual differences in mean speed and standard deviation. These values 
shall serve as a plausible range of the impact on travel speed. More specifically, I define 
their average per highway as the central case scenario.  
 
TABLE 6–7: MINIMUM, AVERAGE AND MAXIMUM ANNUAL CHANGES IN MEAN SPEEDS 
AND STANDARD DEVIATION OF MEAN SPEEDS BY HIGHWAY (KM/H). 
  Mean speed Standard deviation 
  Min Average Max Min Average Max 
H1N - H1G -2.17816 -2.880320 -3.53651 -1.911015 -2.767387 -4.0079706 
H2N - H2G -6.72654 -7.725240 -9.08972 -1.578562 -2.011114 -2.778523 
Source: own table and calculations based on speed data as described in 6.1.4.  
  
                                                 
 
46 The tests assume normality of the sample so I plot the distribution of mean speeds by highway together 
with the respective normal distribution in APPENDIX 8. The plots show little deviation from the normal 










2015 2016 2017 2015 2016 2017
Std. Dev. Mean Speed Std. Dev. 85th percentile speed
km
/h
Difference in Standard Deviation of annual mean speed 
and 85th percentile speed
H2G-H2N all Speed Stations included H2G-H2N 130 km/h only H1G-H1N
Figure 6-5: Difference in standard deviation of annual mean speed and 85th percentile speed. Source: own figure 
based on speed data as described in 6.1.4. 
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Based on the observed data, the central case for the impact on travel speed is an expected 
reduction in mean speed of passenger cars by -2.88 km/h / -7.76 km/h on Highway 1/ 
Highway 2 respectively. Likewise, the expected reduction in standard deviation of mean 
speeds is -2.77km/h / -2.01 km/h.  
The study design and selection of the highway sections tries to ensure a high comparabil-
ity on each of the highways. Still, I do not isolate the causal effect of the speed limit, and 
thus cannot claim with certainty, that the full effect calculated is causally attributable to 
the posted speed limit. However, it was shown that both hypothesis stated at the beginning 
of this section are supported by the descriptive data analysis. Mean speeds and speed 
variances are clearly reduced on the Dutch highways indicating a slower and more ho-
mogenous traffic flow. This finding may also have impacts on the traffic safety, where it 
is turned to in the next section.  
6.3 Impact of a general speed limit on accidents 
The central question dealt with in this section is: How would traffic safety be affected by 
a general speed limit on German highways? In the analysis of travel speeds it was found 
that both, speed and speed variance decrease on the speed-limited highways. This gives 
rise to analyze, whether the theories introduced in the literature review are reflected in 
the data. Therefore, this section assesses if a speed limit would increase traffic safety and 
sets up the following hypotheses. 
 
1.  Accidents would be less in number (“Variance kills” theory is reflected). 
2. Accidents would be of reduced severity (“Speed kills” theory is reflected).  
 
Along the lines of testing these hypotheses, it is the aim to provide an estimate of the 
expected difference in fatalities as well as severely and lightly injured individuals. Thus, 
I will mostly use the absolute differences between the two highway parts for comparison.    
As my data set covers a long period of 12 years (2005-2016), it is necessary to deal with 
the amendment of the Dutch maximum speed policy in 2012. To do so, I distinguish two 
phases for the comparison (see TABLE 6–8).  
 
TABLE 6–8: TWO PHASES FOR ACCIDENT ANALYSIS. 
  National Maximum Speed Policy on highways 
Phase Period Germany Netherlands 
1 12/2016 – 10/2012 No binding limit 130 km/h 
2 09/2012 – 01/2005 No binding limit 120 km/h 
Source: own table.   
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For a 12-year period, it was not feasible to retrace all speed limit changes that might have 
occurred on the two highways. Fortunately, police records include the posted speed limit 
at the site of the accident in both countries. Therefore, I evaluate accidents only, when 
they occur at sites with a posted speed limit of 130 km/h (120 km/h) in Phase 1 (Phase 2) 
and compare them to those with no posted speed limit in Germany. I include the second 
phase because the general speed limit of 120 km/h provides some variance for the analysis 
and may therefore turn out to be a check for robustness of the effects. This means that 
comparison shall be conducted between no limit in Germany and the particular general 
speed limit per period, which jointly will be called the “speed limits of interest” in the 
following. 
Extracting and comparing the individual accidents based on the posted speed limit, re-
quires that the absolute road length that is subject to the speed limit of interest, is equal 
for the domestic and foreign part compared. Highway 1 very well meets this condition. 
Based on the figures in TABLE 6–1, the total length of unlimited segments on H1G is 112.1 
km, which is almost equivalent to 114.8 road kilometers limited by 130 km/h on H1N.
47 
Additionally, I showed that one could realistically assume speed limits to follow the dis-
tribution illustrated in FIGURE 6-2 at least for Phase 1.  
From Ministerie van Infrastructuur en Milieu (2012) it is known, that the same road seg-
ments along H1N that are limited by 130 km/h today, used to be subject to 120 km/h under 
the preceding maximum speed policy. I will need to assume this to be true for Phase 2 in 
general. This is a relatively strong assumption, but I present results for both phases sepa-
rately. 
Highway 2 has more variation in speed limits and does not fulfil the prerequisite described 
above. A comparison and derivation of effects based on the selected approach would thus 
be questionable, which forces me to narrow down my analysis to Highway 1 only.  
 
For the years 2005 to 2016 my data file contains a total of 6,153 police-recorded accidents 
on Highway 1. 2,916 of these occurred on the German part while the remaining 3,237 
accumulate from the Dutch section. These initial figures are relatively balanced and in 
fact, there were more accidents documented on H1N than on H1G. After dropping all acci-
dents at sites with a speed limit different from those in TABLE 6–8, I still observe 3,413 
accidents. In TABLE 6–9 I set out the accident counts by highway and severity category.  
As noted, I will concentrate on person-damage accidents (category 1-3) due to the pecu-
liarities in the German data collection process. Additionally, from the public perspective, 
                                                 
 
47 H1G: Total length of 158 km * 71% with no limit = 112.1 km. H1N: Total length of 140 km * 82% of limit 
130 km/h = 114.8 km.  
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these are of highest interest.48 However, the table shall give an idea of the significant 
share of property-damage only accidents. In the Netherlands, this category amounted to 
89% of all accidents listed. In Germany, this number is only 68%, but represents a lower 
bound since this category was rarely reported in the years prior to 2008.49    
 
 
Now, the remaining analysis focuses on the category 1-3 accidents. When the speed limits 
of interest account for 71% (H1G) and 82% (H1N) of the total road length, one would 
expect their section’s share of total accidents to match these proportions if they are uni-
formly distributed along the highway. FIGURE 6-6 does this comparison.  
                                                 
 
48 Person damage crashes may not necessarily constitute the highest economic value due to the high share 
of property damage crashes. However, I assert that most people agree to the idea, that for moral reasons 
one would rather omit property damage accidents than fatalities within a SCBA irrespective of their abso-
lute economic cost to society.  
49 See the significant surge of category 4 accidents reported in APPENDIX 12.  
TABLE 6–9: ACCIDENTS BY HIGHWAY AND SEVERITY CLASS, 2005-2016.  
Fatal (1) Severe injury (2) Light injury (3) Property damage (4) Total 
H1G 12 190 407 1291 1900 
H1N 16 86 65 1346 1513 




















Fatal Serious Injury Light Injury Fatal Serious Injury Light Injury
H1G H1N
Total Limit of Interest % of all victims under limit of interest
Figure 6-6: Total accidents with person damage and the corresponding share on sections with speed limit of inter-
est, 2005-2016. Source: own figure based on accident data as described in 6.1.4.  
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Over the categories 1-3, 63% (H1G) and 80% (H1N) of total accidents are attributable to 
these sections, which is roughly confirming the expected proportion.50 The graph pro-
vides first evidence for Hypothesis 1 as the accident counts are clearly greater on the 
German part. This is illustrated by the bars projected on the primary axis. While for fatal 
accidents, the counts are in a similar range, the accident figures of the other two categories 
on H1G certainly go beyond those on H1N. Moreover, the grey line in the chart depicts the 
share of total crashes that are included in the analysis for each severity category. This is 
interesting because there is a clear trend that with severity, also the share of accidents 
increases. As the speed limits of interest are the highest possible within the countries, this 
indicates that the higher the severity category, the more of these accidents in the category 
fall into sections where higher speeds are allowed. This holds within both countries and 
provides a first argument in favor of Hypothesis 2, namely that accidents may be of re-
duced severity when speed limits restrict the traveled speeds.  
In contrast, between the countries, the level is constantly higher on the Dutch part. This 
is represented by the grey line, which is consistently above the level of its German equiv-
alent. Since the potentially allowed speed is higher on the German side, one would expect 
a higher accident share in each category, which speaks against Hypothesis 2. This may 
partly be due to the larger total number of crashes, which does not apply to fatal accidents 
as they are quite similarly frequented.    
To dig deeper into the data, I disentangle accidents into the two periods defined and com-
pute their annual sums. Additionally, the actually harmed individuals need to be consid-
ered. TABLE 6–10 comprises the absolute annual differences in accidents and victims by 
severity class. In bold, I report the mean country difference for each time phase.51 Since 
the phases are of different length and the year 2012 is split up between the two, I normal-
ize the absolute difference in accidents and victims by the number of month in the respec-
tive phase and scale up this monthly average in order to obtain annual mean values.52 
Since accidents designate an economic cost, positive figures indicate an increase in acci-
dent cost for Germany, while negative values imply a reduction. The table is composed 
from the domestic perspective as it provides estimates of differences for Germany if they 
had the same policy as in the Netherlands.  
 
                                                 
 
50 Percentage share of the sum of accidents over all three categories. Germany: 609/974; Netherlands: 
167/210. 
51 See APPENDIX 13 for the absolute counts per year and highway, which serves as a basis for the calcula-
tions here.  





) ∙ 12 , where 𝐴𝑝𝑗
𝐻1𝑁 is the total number of accidents of cate-
gory j in phase 𝑝 on the German highway and 𝑚𝑝 is the number of month in phase 𝑝 ∈ {1,2}. Calculation 
of the mean difference in victims per phase was done accordingly.  
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The last two columns show the total difference of accidents and victims over all catego-
ries. It becomes evident that the data provides broad support for Hypothesis 1. When 
summarized over all categories, both the number of crashes and the number of victims 
are larger on the German road part. This is true for every year and shows that it is reason-
able to expect accident counts and victims to decline, when Dutch highway regulations 
would apply in Germany. In fact, the differences in severe and light injury accidents are 
quite large. For example, in 2014 there were 47 fewer accidents and a total of 73 fewer 
victims registered on H1N. The major share of accidents are light vehicle accidents (30 
crashes) which caused 56 light injured persons. 53  This is a common pattern throughout 
                                                 
 
53 Not all victims stem from the crashes of the same severity class. It needs only one injury of a certain 
severity to attribute the accident to this respective category. For example, light injured people can evolve 
from every accident category whereas traffic deaths can naturally be a result only of fatal accidents. 
TABLE 6–10: ANNUAL DIFFERENCE IN TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS AND VICTIMS  
BY PHASE AND SEVERITY CATEGORY, 2005-2016. 
  Fatal Serious Injury Light Injury Total 
  Acc. Pers. Acc. Pers. Acc. Pers. Acc. Pers. 
H1N-H1G 
       
  
Phase 1 0.00 0.00 -11.29 -12.24 -30.12 -52.24 -41.41 -64.47 
2016 -1.00 -1.00 -4.00 -6.00 -33.00 -63.00 -38.00 -70.00 
2015 2.00 2.00 -5.00 -4.00 -34.00 -47.00 -37.00 -49.00 
2014 0.00 0.00 -17.00 -17.00 -30.00 -56.00 -47.00 -73.00 
2013 -1.00 -1.00 -18.00 -21.00 -27.00 -50.00 -46.00 -72.00 
  Q4 
2012 
0.00 0.00 -4.00 -4.00 -4.00 -6.00 -8.00 -10.00 
  
       
  
Phase 2 0.52 0.90 -7.23 -8.26 -27.61 -46.71 -34.32 -54.06 
Q1-3 2012  0.00 0.00 -8.00 -12.00 -21.00 -41.00 -29.00 -53.00 
2011 -1.00 -1.00 -17.00 -18.00 -28.00 -38.00 -46.00 -57.00 
2010 -1.00 -1.00 -18.00 -20.00 -33.00 -53.00 -52.00 -74.00 
2009 -1.00 -1.00 3.00 4.00 -18.00 -36.00 -16.00 -33.00 
2008 -1.00 2.00 -6.00 -7.00 -25.00 -55.00 -32.00 -60.00 
2007 2.00 2.00 -11.00 -20.00 -29.00 -37.00 -38.00 -55.00 
2006 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1.00 -36.00 -57.00 -36.00 -58.00 
2005 6.00 6.00 1.00 10.00 -24.00 -45.00 -17.00 -29.00 
Note: The table reports the annual differences in accidents and persons per year within each phase. The 
phase totals are the average annual difference within the phase. To calculate these, I take the difference 
in accidents and persons for each category, normalize it with the number of months in the particular 
phase and multiply by 12 month. The differences are such that I subtract the Dutch from the German 
values. Consequently, positive (negative) values imply an increase (decrease) in accidents or victims 
from the German perspective.  
Source: Own table based on accident data as described in section 6.1.4.  
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the years because intuitively (and luckily) with increasing severity, accidents tend to oc-
cur less frequently. Merely for the fatal accidents (and two annual exceptions in severe 
accidents) a higher number in crashes and victims is observed on H1N in some years. 
Remarkable in this category is the year 2005, where the German highway section re-
mained free of casualties while the Dutch highway section experienced six fatal crashes. 
This year constitutes an outlier in the data. However, this renders the accident analysis 
slightly more conservative, as potential benefits are reduced by keeping the data point. 
Also, the annual case numbers are so low in the category, that this is likely caused by 
sample size and does not reflect a structural relation between the countries.  
TABLE 6–10 shows that a structural decline in accidents is observable, where the Dutch 
regulations apply. While I cannot explicitly name the variance in speeds as a central cause 
for this observation, the previous section showed that speed variances are indeed consist-
ently larger on the German sections compared to their Dutch counterparts. What is evident 
from TABLE 6–10 is that Hypothesis 1, namely that accident counts are expected to de-
cline when a speed limit would be implemented, is well supported. 
With respect to Hypothesis 2, the analysis offers mixed results. The total accident figures 
aggregated over the years 2005 to 2016 (FIGURE 6-6) indicate that more severe crashes 
tend to happen more frequently in those areas within the particular highway part, where 
the highest travel speeds are allowed. If Hypothesis 2 is to hold, a comparison between 
the countries should reveal a shifted distribution of the accidents towards less severe 
crashes in the Netherlands. To see this I present the relative frequencies of accidents for 
each category in the pie charts below. The data is restricted to Phase 1 because during this 
phase category 4 accidents have been collected consistently and can be summarized over 
the years included. It is salient, that the share of the accident categories with person dam-
age (1-3) is clearly larger on H1G (~ 23%) than on H1N (~ 6%). Again, on a highly aggre-





1 2 3 4
Figure 6-7: Relative accident frequencies by severity category in Phase 1 on H1G and H1N. 
Note: The graph on the left hand side displays relative accident frequencies by severity category in Phase 1 on 
H1G. H1N  is illustrated similarly on the right hand side. 
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However, the desired and politically intended effect of a speed limit is that its implemen-
tation would materialize in relative declines of accidents. For the present case this means 
that the accident statistics on H1G should converge to the figures observed on H1N when 
adopting the Dutch regulations. Consequently, the relative accident reductions within 
each severity category should be most pronounced for the fatal accidents and then grad-
ually diminishing in magnitude of change for lower severity classes. I calculated the rel-
ative declines corresponding to TABLE 6–10 but they neither showed the expected nor 
other interesting patterns.54  
I cannot make a statement about the robustness of this effect, since I analyze Highway 1 
only. Thus, the absence of the expected effects may be explained by the relatively small 
sample size of the case. The conclusion remains that there are mixed results for Hypoth-
esis 2. The tendency of higher speeds resulting in more severe accidents can be cited from 
previous studies,55 but my setting does not fully mirror this finding. If there was a general 
speed limit on the German highway part, one could claim the distribution of all accidents 
to converge towards to the distribution found in the Netherlands, meaning that the relative 
frequencies per severity category converge. In contrast, the actually observed differences 
within each category did not yield the desired effects, leaving the argument subject to 
doubt.  
The overall hypothesis predicted an increase in traffic safety as a direct result of the in-
troduction of a speed limit. This hypothesis is principally confirmed by the data. More 
research on the German case would be needed to make valid causal explanation but I give 
an idea of reasonable values. As stated above, the focus in the subsequent monetization 
within the CBA is the change in persons harmed. I want to rely on the observed data and 
stay consistent with the analysis of travel speeds in the previous section. Thus, the central 
case here needs to be the evaluation of the impacts of a speed limit of 130 km/h, which 
corresponds to Phase 1 in the present accident analysis. I therefore define their annual 
average changes as the expected effects of a 130 km/h speed limit on German highways 













  ∀ 𝑗 ∈ {1,2,3}    [4] 
Where v= victims 
j= severity category (1 – fatal, 2 – severe injury, 3 – light injury) 
I= number of years in Period 1 
                                                 
 
54 Since they were of little information, I do not present the calculations. Nevertheless, the relative differ-
ences can easily be calculated from the total values presented in APPENDIX 13. 
55 See Chapter 2.  
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i= specific year in period 1 
G/N= German/ Dutch highway  
vkm= estimate of annual vehicle kilometers per year (TABLE 6–2) 
m= Number of month in year i included in Period 1 (e.g. 2012: m = 3) 
 
These weighted average changes need to be normalized by annual vehicle kilometers 
traveled in order to maintain comparability when applying them in the valuation.56 The 
calculation leads to the central case accident differentials per vehicle mile. TABLE 6–11 
composes the expected changes per million vehicle kilometers.57 As I subtract the Ger-
man from the Dutch figures, negative values imply an estimated reduction of victims per 
vehicle km on German highways under a 130km/h speed limit. For example, in this cen-
tral case scenario based on data from Highway 1, I calculate an expected annual decrease 
of 0.0366 light injured persons per million vehicle kilometers. 
6.4 Impact of a general speed limit on fuel consumption and emissions 
When assessing transport projects, an analysis of the environmental impacts is essential. 
Largely, these impacts are dependent on the changes in fuel consumption attributable to 
the same project. Additionally, fuel is one of the two major components of operating costs 
of driving a vehicle. The other is depreciation, which is rather fixed and insensitive to 
small changes in speed (see Kockelmann, 2006 p. 29). This section therefore deals with 
the assessment of expected fuel economy effects as well as the environmental aspects. 
The latter was classified into global and local emissions in the literature review, where it 
was found that the impact of speed limits cannot always be predicted with certainty.58 
What the reviewed studies have in common is that they rely on collected measurement 
data for the emissions analyzed. Within the scope of this thesis, it was not feasible to 
collect similar data myself. Therefore, the approach employed here will be to infer 
changes in emissions as well as fuel consumption from the comprehensive speed data set. 
                                                 
 
56 The weighting in the calculations is simply due to the fact, that only the fourth quarter of 2012 falls into 
Period 1.  
57 Applying [4] on the total accident victims as tabulated in APPENDIX 13 one can reproduce the calculations.  
58 See chapter 2.  
TABLE 6–11: EXPECTED CHANGE IN ANNUAL TRAFFIC VICTIMS BY SEVERITY CATEGORY 
PER MILLION VEHICLE KILOMETERS. 
  
Fatal Victims 
Serious Injury  
Victims 
Light Injury  
Victims 
Central case Change  
in number of victims 
-0.00000521873 -0.00827941907 -0.03655438992 
Source: own table and calculations based on accident and vehicle kilometers data as described in section 
6.1.4 
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The relationship between fuel consumption and (mean) speed is typically U-shaped.59 For 
the speed ranges driven on highways (i.e. typically above 80km/h) the function typically 
has a positive slope, which leads to the expectation that increases in speed lead to higher 
fuel consumption, while decreases are associated with fuel economies. With respect to 
global CO2 emissions, the relationship to speed in this case is clearly positive as it is the 
main product from fuel combustion (see European Environment Agency, 2016, p.9). Be-
cause a liter of fuel combusted always releases a stable amount of carbon dioxide, there 
exists no viable technology which can reduce this emission component per liter of diesel 
or gasoline (see Parry et al., 2007, p. 376).60 For the analysis, this fact allows to infer the 
changes in CO2 emissions from estimated changes in fuel consumption.  
In some contrast, regulations have been successful in decreasing local emissions over the 
past decades. Meanwhile the tailpipe emissions, which are of concern here, normally vary 
more with vehicle kilometers than the mean travel speed (see Parry et al., 2007, p.375). 
However, the emission level can still be expected to be dependent on driving speed char-
acteristics (see Korzhenevych et al., 2014, p 8).  
To approximate the impact of traffic speed on fuel consumption and emissions one cannot 
simply infer from the difference in mean speed since the effects are unlikely to be linear.61 
Therefore, I will work with the distribution of speeds as observed in the data and compare 
the domestic with the foreign. This represents the expected situation if the German high-
ways were subject to the same 130 km/h limit. Hence, the hypothesis set up for this sec-
tion is:  
 
1. A speed limit on German highways leads to improved fuel economy and reduces 
local and global emissions due to its decreasing and homogenizing impact on 
the distribution of travel speeds.  
 
The speed analysis already indicated that a speed limit leads to a decrease in mean speeds 
and the distribution of travel speeds is expected to contract to a smaller range. To empha-
size this, I analyze the deciles of the speed distribution as observed in the dataset.  
TABLE 6–12 provides the upper bounds (UB) as well as the respective mean speeds for 
each decile by highway section.  
 
                                                 
 
59 See e.g. Mellios et al. (2011), p. 80 for the case of CO2.  
60 For example, the British government publishes conversion factors for organizations obliged to report 
their UK- operations emissions. According to their 2016 figures one can translate a liter of conventional 
gasoline (diesel) into 2.3 kg (2.6 kg) of carbon dioxide. See: Department for Business, Energy & Industrial 
Strategy (2016). 
61 See e.g. Mellios et al. (2011).   
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In the lowest and highest decile, the comparison of mean to upper bound speed shows a 
very wide range. I decided to increase the granularity of the analysis and calculate all 
percentile values. This also improves the precision of the monetization in chapter 7.  
 
The comparison between the countries is illustrated in FIGURE 6-8 where I calculate the 
relative in- or decrease of mean speeds for each percentile as percentage changes from 
the German value.62 Accordingly, a negative value indicates an expected decrease in 
speed in a given percentile of travel speeds, if there was a 130 km/h speed limit in Ger-
many. What can be noted is that the effects for the lowest 30% of observed speeds are 
ambiguous. In absolute terms, the 3rd decile is found around 115 km/h up to which the 
effects on the highways show little clear effects. On Highway 1, the first percentile shows 
a decrease in mean speeds of roughly 4%. After that, mean speeds are in most cases higher 
                                                 
 
62 The totals of the speed percentiles are shown in APPENDIX 14.  
TABLE 6–12: MEANS AND UPPER BOUNDS OF THE SPEED DISTRIBUTION DECILES  
BY HIGHWAY SECTION. 
Decile H1G H1N  
Mean UB Mean UB 
1 95.444 108.000 99.313 109.626 
2 109.713 112.000 111.334 112.818 
3 113.039 115.000 114.047 115.175 
4 116.523 119.000 116.119 116.990 
5 119.514 121.000 117.768 118.532 
6 121.995 124.000 119.326 120.149 
7 124.944 127.000 121.143 122.300 
8 128.801 132.000 124.017 125.985 
9 134.321 138.000 127.959 129.918 
10 144.336 232.000 134.117 189.000 




     
Decile H2G H2N 
 Mean UB Mean UB 
1 92.986 104.000 84.577 103.465 
2 107.202 111.000 106.849 109.148 
3 113.092 116.000 110.834 112.444 
4 117.579 120.000 113.901 115.279 
5 121.511 124.000 116.630 118.000 
6 125.000 127.000 119.438 120.910 
7 128.403 131.000 122.333 123.681 
8 133.763 138.000 124.935 126.166 
9 140.909 145.000 127.491 128.997 
10 151.598 250.000 133.182 188.000 
Overall mean 123.735  116.018  
Source: own table and calculations based speed data as described in section 6.1.4 
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on H1N compared with H1G. This effect declines with higher speeds, fluctuates around 
zero and turns negative at the 27th percentile.  
On Highway 2, I observe high negative differences for the lowest percentiles. These may 
again be explained by periods of heavy congestion or unobserved factors in the analyzed 
period (2015-2017) such as construction sites, which – as mentioned – were not possible 
to account for. Again, as in the assessment of travel speeds above, the change on Highway 
2 is systematically more pronounced. However, the general effects are in line with previ-
ously stated expectations. The lower speeds are ambiguous and sometimes even higher 
in the Netherlands, which may be due to homogenized traffic flow. The higher the mean 
speeds become, the larger the negative percentage change which is reflecting the natural 
fact, that higher speeds are targeted more profoundly by a speed limit policy. At the same 
time, this shows the alignment in the distribution of travel speeds.  










































Change in mean speed by percentile
Highway 1 Highway 2
Figure 6-8: Comparison of relative differences in mean speeds within percentiles. Source: own figure and  
calculations.  
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The next step is to introduce emission factors applicable to the estimated changes in the 
speed distribution. To do so, I follow the official methodological guideline complement-
ing the “Bundesverkehrswegeplan 2030”, which is the German traffic forecast and plan-
ning conducted and published by the BMVI. It recommends to make use of the “Hand-
buch Emissionsfaktoren des Straßenverkehrs” (HBEFA) (see BMVI, 2016b, p.142). This 
“Handbook of Emission Factors for Road Transport“ is created and maintained under the 
authority of the environmental agencies of several European countries – including Ger-
many. It is also supported by the Joint Research Center of the European Commission 
(JRC).63 The comprehensive database provides emission factors for different vehicle cat-
egories and a variety of emissions – including the EU- regulated air pollutants of interest 
– as well as fuel consumption. In the freely available online version of the handbook, it 
is not possible to obtain values contingent on travel speed. However, the UBA, which is 
the institution in charge for Germany kindly provided the desired speed-dependent emis-
sion factors.  
 
TABLE 6–13: SPEED DEPENDENT EMISSION FACTORS  
FOR AN AVERAGE DIESEL AND GASOLINE PASSENGER CAR. 
 
Speed in km/h 
Diesel  80 90 100 110 120 130 >130 
FC 40.1570 39.7314 40.6430 44.7432 47.6392 50.8867 56.7559 
CO 0.0175 0.0126 0.0100 0.0125 0.0092 0.0072 0.0075 
HC 0.0073 0.0069 0.0065 0.0057 0.0053 0.0057 0.0065 
NOx 0.4936 0.5646 0.5930 0.6714 0.8468 1.1338 1.4845 
PM 0.0068 0.0064 0.0069 0.0073 0.0083 0.0097 0.0104 
Gasoline 
FC 46.7305 46.5712 48.6153 55.3889 63.1100 69.5586 75.3210 
CO 0.3106 0.2926 0.4021 0.6135 1.0270 1.9508 3.9251 
HC 0.0115 0.0119 0.0136 0.0150 0.0180 0.0250 0.0414 
NOx 0.0524 0.0575 0.0578 0.0691 0.0830 0.1177 0.1302 
PM 0.0012 0.0012 0.0016 0.0024 0.0041 0.0060 0.0078 
Note: The table provides speed-dependent emission factors for an average German 2015 (gasoline / die-
sel) passenger car. For the fuel consumption, the following densities are used: 742 g/l for gasoline, and 
832 g/l for diesel. All emissions are tailpipe-only. This applies especially to PM which implies that PM 
can be understood as PM2.5 since all particulate from internal combustion is smaller than 2.5 μm. NOx is 
expressed in NO2 equivalents since emitted NO quickly oxidizes into NO2.  
Source: data provided by UBA. The definitions stem from the HBEFA website (see Footnote 63).  
 
TABLE 6–13 presents the emission factors in gram per vehicle kilometer for an average 
German diesel and gasoline passenger car for the year 2015. The average vehicle is de-
termined by a number of characteristics of the German vehicle fleet of the respective 
                                                 
 
63 See HBEFA accessible under www.hbefa.net (link last updated 17.08.2018).  
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year.64 Included are fuel consumption (FC), and the key local emissions as regulated 
within the EU (CO, HC, NOx, PM). HBEFA measures tailpipe emissions only, which is 
the focus of my analysis. 
The next problem to solve is to perpetuate the discrete emission factors, such that the 
calculated percentile speeds in the current and expected case can be plugged into some 
speed-emission function. To do so, I fit a second order polynomial trend for each of the 
emission factors and differentiate by fuel type using the defined speed observations.65 
Thus, by plugging the speeds per country and highway into the speed-emission functions, 
I can calculate the expected fuel consumption and emission effects per vehicle kilometer 
on a percentile basis. The estimation of CO2 changes is then directly converted from fuel 
consumption changes.66  
These differences by highway and fuel type in gram/vkm constitute the central case ef-
fects for each emission (fuel) factor. As these are comprehensive tables and the scaling is 
of little intuitive accessibility I provide them in the APPENDIX 16. However, the figures 
are used in the subsequent monetization chapter, where I describe the monetization pro-
cess and present higher aggregated figures. Generally, sticking with the percentile 
changes accounts for the different impact of a speed limit on shares of traffic. Also, the 
numbers illustrated in FIGURE 6-8 resemble the plausible phenomenon that speed limits 
target the higher speeds more and thus have a higher impact. In this context, when calcu-
lating changes in emissions from speed differentials, it is favorable to work with relative 
changes in speed since this takes into account that the higher initial levels of traffic speeds 
on a given highway are, the more noticeable effects are likely to be reached. 
 
This chapter first provided the necessary backgrounds to understand the analysis ap-
proach. Afterwards the central case scenario of expected impacts from a 130 km/h speed 
limit on German highways were defined systematically. Jointly, the preceding sections 
have answered the second research question of this work. At the end of each impacts’ 
subsection the expected magnitude and direction of change has been presented. The sub-
sequent chapter turns towards the monetary valuation of these impacts, which is no 
straightforward task as the categories constitute non-market impacts. 
                                                 
 
64 These characteristics include for example vehicle mass, engine power an others. See e.g. Mellios et al. 
(2011).    
65 This excludes the last column of TABLE 6–13, because it represents a mean value for higher speeds and 
is therefore not directly attributable to a certain km/h level.  
66 Following HBEFA, the conversion factor to be used here is 3.135 gram (3.179 gram) per gram of gasoline 
(diesel) combusted. With the mean density of 742 g/l for gasoline, and 832 g/l for diesel, this is equivalent 
to 2,326kg CO2/ l Gasoline and 2,645 kg CO2/ l Diesel, which is also consistent with the values in Footnote 
60.  
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7 VALUING COSTS AND BENEFITS 
This part aims at putting a price tag at the core benefit and cost categories. It follows, that 
the focus here is to provide an answer to the third and last research question, namely if – 
from a social perspective – a speed limit policy as described would be desirable.    
Therefore, I calculate the social net benefits, which are estimated to occur annually on 
the sections investigated. These arise from the following impacts: 
 
1. Opportunity cost of travel time  
2. Fatal, severe and light injured individuals from traffic accidents 
3. Fuel economy  
4. Local and global air pollution  
 
Valuation of these impacts requires attributing prices to each item. With the exception of 
fuel consumption, for which one can make use of the gasoline or diesel price, all of these 
impacts are non-market goods.67 This requires shadow pricing of these impacts. A shadow 
price – or equivalently “accounting price” – can be both a corrected price of a market-
determined value (e.g. when the analyst is convinced, that market values are too heavily 
distorted by market failures) or a price for goods, where no market exists at all (see Mis-
han and Quah, 2007, p.61f.). Obtaining defendable valuations for non-market goods often 
requires comprehensive research. Fortunately, this is a common issue in transport pro-
jects, which allows the use of readily available studies and guidelines.   
In the central case valuation I rely on available figures from the “Bundesverkehr-
swegeplan 2030” (see BMVI, 2016a). This is advantageous for three reasons. First, it 
provides values explicitly tailored to local German circumstances. Second, it supports the 
defensibility of the prices used, as they are taken from official government documents. 
Third, its methodological complementing material provides inputs or recommended 
sources for each of the impacts, allowing for a consistent valuation over all considered 
impacts. Moreover, the report ensures a consistent price level, which allows for direct 
comparability of the impacts. In line with the report I use real 2012 Euro in the analysis 
(see BMVI, 2016b, p. 95). The figures suggested by the federal ministry are collected 
from the methodological handbook which complements the report. It serves as the main 
source for the required accounting prices in the central case scenario, composed in TABLE 
7–1.  
 
                                                 
 
67 Admittedly, also emissions are traded on markets sometimes, for example when considering emission 
certificates for corporations. Still, they are not typical market goods nor are the emissions from private 
transport priced directly.  
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TABLE 7–1: ACCOUNTING PRICES AND CORE VALUATION PARAMETERS  




Travel Time Opportunity cost 
Business travel 27.48 €/h Own calculation based 
on BMVI 2016b 
Non-Business travel 9.71 €/h Own calculation based 
on BMVI 2016b 
Avrg. Passengers/ vehicle* 
Business travel 1.1 Passengers/Car BMVI 2016b 
Leisure travel 2 Passengers/Car BMVI 2016b 
Share of Trips by Travel Purpose** 
Business Travel 15.5 % of total person-
km traveled 
Own calculations based 
on BVU et al., (2010).  
Non-Business Travel 84.5 % of total person-
km traveled 
Own calculations based 
on BVU et al., (2010). 
Social cost of accident impacts 
Value of a statistical life 
(VSL) 
2.480.996 €/ victim BMVI 2016b 
Severe injury 287.635 €/ victim BMVI 2016b 
Light injury 18.020 €/ victim BMVI 2016b 
Social cost of Emissions 
CO2 86.5 €/t Own calculation based 
on UBA, (2014)/ 
BMVI 2016b   
CO 62 €/t BMVI 2016b 
NOX 15400 €/t BMVI 2016b 
HC 1700 €/t BMVI 2016b 
PM (exhaust only) 122800 €/t BMVI 2016b 
Fuel cost  
Gasoline / Diesel 0.71 €/l BMVI 2016b 
Share of passenger cars by fuel type 




Transport Authority / 
(Kraftfahrtbundesamt) 
KBA 
Annual vehicle kilometers traveled 
H1G 1,190,914,335 Km/ year Own data & calculation 
from 6.1 
H2G 1,151,492,875 Km/ year Own data & calculation 
from 6.1 
Note: All prices given in 2012 Euro.  
*Values are taken from Table 43 in source as cited. They assume a travel distance of more than 50 km. 
** The source cited defines a current state value for 2010 as well as a forecast for 2030 for the number 
of person kilometers traveled by trip purpose (private, shopping, work, apprenticeship etc.) in Germany. 
For each trip type, I interpolate the figures linearly and classify the distinct purposes as either business 
or non-business travel. For this classification is follow BMVI 2016b, p. 96. 
Source: as given in the last column of the table. 
 
Social opportunity cost of travel time 
Here and in the following I will abstract from potential changes in traffic demand. This 
means a speed limit policy would not induce or divert any traffic. The core parameter to 
calculate this welfare cost component is the value of time (VoT). If a citizens’ travel time 
increases due to lower speeds, the opportunity costs of the trip rise due to the increase in 
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time forgone which could have been used in other utility-adding ways. Examples are more 
leisure or additional paid working hours. There is vast academic literature on the VoT and 
“the preferred source from where to obtain value(s) of time at country level should be 
official national data, based on local research” (see European Commission, 2015, p.90). 
The BMVI reports time values by distance based on a mix of revealed and stated prefer-
ences methods (see BMVI, 2016b, p.97ff).68 The value of time increases with trip distance 
in the study, which is reasonable since for longer rides it becomes more valuable to save 
a certain amount of time. I distinguish two travel types, namely business and non-busi-
ness. For both, the distance of H1G (79 km) is used and calculated from the figures pro-
vided in BMVI (2016b) by linear interpolation.  
Based on the estimate of vehicle km traveled and the respective share by trip type I cal-
culate the difference in hours needed to complete the distance. Therefore, I apply the 
central case speed result from chapter 6 to the mean speeds observed on H1G and H2G. 
This time differential can then be priced with the respective value of time for business 
and non-business travel. Under this procedure, the expected social time opportunity cost 
for the two sections per year are: 
 
Clearly, the larger fraction of time opportunity cost on both highways is attributable to 
non-business travel. Despite the higher hourly opportunity cost for business trips, the high 
share of privately driven vehicle kilometers and the fact that the occupancy rate of busi-
ness travel is lower, leads to these results. In line with expectations, the larger speed dif-
ference on Highway 2 results in higher opportunity cost. In fact, the social cost is 2.6 
times larger compared with Highway 1. The figures explicitly carry a minus sign, as they 
constitute cost incurred to social welfare. 
 
Fatal, severe and light injured individuals from traffic accidents  
In chapter 6 I derived an estimate of injuries and deaths, which would statistically be 
saved per vehicle kilometer when adopting the Dutch speed limit policy. BMVI (2016b) 
                                                 
 
68 These methods are commonly applied for shadow pricing in CBA. In this particular case, respondents 
were confronted with different travel options that varied in dimensions of price and time (revealed prefer-
ence method) and also asked about their actual travel behavior (stated preference method). The study was 
commissioned by the BMVI (see TNS Infratest /IVT /ETH Zürich 2015).   
TABLE 7–2: ANNUAL SOCIAL COST FROM TRAVEL TIME. 
 Business   Non-Business 
H1G - 1,118,723.82 €    - 3,911,181.97 € 
H2G - 2,906,001.81 €   - 10,159,703.13 € 
Source: own table and calculations. 
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defines two economic cost components for valuing person damage based on estimates 
from Bundesanstalt für Straßenwesen (2010). Firstly, the resource cost reflect lost pro-
duction and economic cost of an accident. Secondly, the risk-value component is a meas-
ure of the WTP of reducing the own risk of dying or being hurt in an accident. It serves 
as “a proxy to estimate pain, grief and suffering caused by traffic accidents in monetary 
values” (see Korzhenevych et al., 2014, p.19). The social cost for a fatality is a special 
shadow price, since it reflects the value of a statistical life (VSL). By nature, putting a 
price tag on a person’s life is subject to much debate, which resulted in enormous attention 
in CBA literature.69  
 
TABLE 7–3: SOCIAL COST OF FATALITIES, SEVERE AND LIGHT INJURIES. 
Cost category  Fatality (VSL) Severe injury Light injury 
Resource cost  1.161.892  116.151  4.829  
Risk-Value- 
Component 
1.319.104  171.484  13.191  
Total social cost  2.480.996  287.635  18.020  
Source: own table based on BMVI 2016b.   
 
I apply these prices and the kilometers traveled to calculate the expected social benefit 
from improvements in traffic safety in the central case scenario. Even though the analysis 
could only be done based on the Highway 1 data, I also apply the estimated changes for 
Highway 2 but scale them by the respective vkm. This is a conservative choice as the 
speed differentials on Highway 2 were considerably higher. Consequently, this may lead 
to an underestimation of the true benefits for Highway 2. The resulting annual social ben-
efits are shown in TABLE 7–4.  
 
TABLE 7–4: ANNUAL SOCIAL BENEFITS FROM TRAFFIC SAFETY. 
 Fatalities  Serious Injuries Light Injuries 
H1G 15,419.53 € 2,836,103.78 € 784,467.31 € 
H2G 14,909.11 € 2,742,223.52 € 758,499.99 € 
Source: own table and calculations.  
 
A first notable peculiarity is the low benefit from fatal accidents. However, the fact, that 
in the period observed there was no difference in the number fatalities between H1G and 
H1N leads to very small changes caused only by different vehicle kilometers traveled on 
the sections. Thus, even though the VSL is the highest price attributable to any accident 
outcome, in this case study the social benefits from the most severe accident category are 
                                                 
 
69 See e.g. Yang et al. (2016), Viscusi and Aldy (2003) as well as any CBA Textbook or public institution 
guidelines on conducting CBA, which are cited in this work.  
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low. Again, due to the plain sample size, this effect can be quite sensitive. The serious 
injuries contribute most to welfare gains followed by the less severe injuries. Whereas the 
number of light injuries per vkm is expected to decrease the most. This effect is simply 
driven by the higher social cost of a serious injury accident. As I observe changes on 
Highway 1 only, the effects just vary slightly between the two sections due to differences 
in total vkm. Again, the H2G estimates presented here can be viewed as a lower bound 
estimate as explained above.   
 
Fuel economy, local and global emissions 
For calculating the private and social cost of fuel and emissions, I use the emission factors 
provided by HBEFA (TABLE 6–13). Based on the central case scenario, which provided 
the change in emissions in gram per vehicle kilometer, I calculate the expected savings 
within each percentile. This implies that 1% of vehicle kilometers driven per highway 
accrue to the individual speed percentile and requires accounting for the share of these 
kilometers attributable to diesel and gasoline vehicles.70 Thereby I can sum up the per-
centile changes for each individual emission factor and calculate the change in tons (liter 
in the case of fuel) for each highway.71 Then I can multiply the total expected emission 
or fuel consumption changes with the particular emission price as stated in TABLE 7–1. 
The social cost of local emission factors are directly provided in BMVI (2016b), while 
the figures for CO2 within the guide stem from UBA (2014). I use the primary source, 
which presents CO2 prices for 2010 and 2030. To derive a consistent valuation, I interpo-
late their figures linearly to obtain a 2012 value. Due to the short time period interpolated 
this should be an acceptable approach.  
For fuel prices I can again rely on BMVI (2016b). Using the same price for both, gasoline 
and diesel may appear unusual from prices known at gas stations. Indeed, the figures stem 
from mean prices observed at gas stations in 2012 but the price composition is modified. 
The authors of the study do not find it plausible that cost components like transport and 
processing differ between the fuel types such that the price differences observed appear 
to be primarily driven by the margin. As this does not reflect economic resource cost 
properly, they correct the values to the presented accounting prices. 
The highway specific changes in tons per emission factor and the corresponding annual 
benefits are shown in TABLE 7–5. Expectedly, improved fuel economy and the narrowly 
linked CO2 emissions yield the largest social benefits, as they are quite sensitive to speed 
                                                 
 
70 This implicitly assumes that there is no difference in the distribution of diesel and gasoline vehicles 
within each percentile, i.e. that we do not have structural differences that a particular vehicle category drives 
faster or slower. In addition, it implies that the cars observed on the highway are representative for the 
German vehicle fleet.  
71 For fuel consumption the ton-value is converted into liters applying the fuel densities according to 
HBEFA: 742 g/l for gasoline, and 832 g/l for diesel. (see Footnote 66) 
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changes. NOx reductions also constitute a significant share of social benefits, which is 
driven primarily by its high social cost per ton. The figures for the diesel engine reflect 
the typical composition of local pollutants from exhaust gas, where NOX has the largest 
share and is followed by PM. The HC/CO emissions are minimal (see Reşitoğlu et al., 
2015, p.17). The PM reductions are very low across fuel types, which is not surprising 
when kept in mind, that I estimate tailpipe emissions only and the largest fraction of PM 
is induced from abrasion (see European Environment Agency, 2016, p.10). Therefore, 
actual PM reductions are plausibly expected above the level reported here.   
I present the total social benefits graphically in FIGURE 7-1 where I summarize the results 
of both fuel categories per highway. Across fuel types the annual social benefits are esti-
mated with 5,820,894 € on H1G and about twice as much on H2G with a total value of 
11,602,126 €. About 63% of these benefits accrue to fuel economy. The remaining share 
is split quite equally between global CO2 emissions (18%) and the joint local emissions 
(18%). These ratios are stable over both highways, which is logical as the same speed-
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TABLE 7–5: ANNUAL SOCIAL BENEFITS FROM FUEL ECONOMY AND EMISSION REDUCTIONS 
   Fuel Consumption Global Emissions Local Emissions 
 Fuel type  FC CO2 CO HC NOx PM 
         
H1G 
Gasoline 
Change in tons  -3,186.920 -9,990.995 -313.130 -2.044 -12.779 -0.910 
Social cost -3,049,479.09 € -864,221.11 € -19,414.07 € -3,474.25 € -196,804.03 € -111,782.13 € 
Diesel 
Change in tons -750.011 -2,384.284 0.018 -0.041 -44.618 -0.344 
Social cost -640,033.07 € -206,240.53 € 1.11 € -69.92 € -687,121.03 € -42,255.88 € 
 
Total Social Cost -3,689,512.16 € -1,070,461.64 € -19,412.96 € -3,544.17 € -883,925.06 € -154,038.01 € 
         
H2G 
Gasoline 
Change in tons -6,368.724 -1,9965.951 -605.173 -3.981 -25.556 -1.794 
Social cost -6,094,062.44 € -1,727,054.76 € -37,520.75 € -6,767.95 € -393,561.42 € -220,292.06 € 
Diesel 
Change in tons -1,498.785 -4,764.636 0.221 -0.035 -87.373 -0.701 
Social cost -1,279,010.86 € -412,141.02 € 13.70 € -58.82 € -1,345,543.25 € -86,127.07 € 
 Total Social Cost -7,373,073.29 € -2,139,195.78 € -37,507.06 € -6,826.76 € -1,739,104.67 € -306,419.13 € 
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8 RESULTS 
Now, should there – from the perspective of normative welfare theory – be a general 
speed limit on German highways? The estimated core impacts from a 130 km/h limit on 
the two German highway sections in the preceding chapter have revealed many insights. 
FIGURE 8-1 takes up on these results and juxtaposes social cost and benefits for the central 
case as derived and estimated above. As the core social cost, travel time losses enter the 
calculations with about 5m € per year on H1G and 13m € on H2G. However, these annual 
social costs are compensated by benefits from traffic safety (3.6m on H1G / 3.5m on H2G), 
fuel economy (3.6m / 7.3m) and emissions reductions (2.1m / 4.2m), which include health 
impacts as the social accounting price is employed.  
In Chapter 3, the Kaldor- Hicks criterion was introduced as a key decision rule. It stated 
that a policy should be adopted only if the beneficiaries could entirely compensate the 
losers and would still be better off. It was noted, that this is the case whenever social net 
benefits are positive. This means, based on the impacts as derived above, a general speed 
limit of 130 km/h on the two German highway sections H1G and H2G is estimated to result 
in annual net social benefits of 4,426,978.84 € and 2,052,054.39 €, respectively. Conse-
quently, – from the perspective of normative welfare theory and under the central case 
scenario assumptions – implementing a 130 km/h speed limit on the highways analyzed 
would be desirable for society.72  
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8.1 Private and External Benefits  
The study finds, that society would be better off having a speed limit on the highways 
investigated. But is a speed limit also desirable when taking the private perspective and 
ignoring the external effects of transport?  
This question gives rise to the fundamental economic motivation for the analysis – the 
external cost from transport activities. Policies such as speed limits are primarily intended 
to target these externalities. Economically, internalization of external effects means mak-
ing the external effects part of the private decision making process (see Korzhenevych et 
al., 2014, p.1). In the present case, a means for internalization is the posted speed limit. It 
was shown that the privately chosen driving speeds without a limit are too high from a 
social perspective, as evident in the welfare increase when speed is reduced. The question 
is whether having a speed limit is rational from a private highway user’s point of view or 
not.  
To shed light on this topic, I classify the different cost and benefit components into either 
private or external. First, time costs are reasonably treated as purely private. Second, fuel 
economy saves private money of the travelers and is considered as a purely private ben-
efit. In the previous analysis, I valued fuel net of taxes because from the social perspective 
taxes constitute a transfer to the government (see e.g. Boardman et al., 2014, p.56). This 
is no longer true from a private point of view, where saving the taxes included in the fuel 
price results in plain additional benefit. Thus, I price this impact at the fuel price including 
taxes.73 Third, I follow Korzhenevych et al. (2014), and treat environmental benefits as 
fully external, thus they do not enter at this point. Fourth, the benefits from traffic safety 
need to be split into a private and an external component. The question who bears the cost 
of an accident is not easily answered. Some of the risk of suffering injuries or property 
damage when using a road is already internalized. Primarily, the internalized costs are 
those costs covered by the insurance, which a particular transport user has paid for (see 
Korzhenevych et al., 2014, p. 21). There exist several methods to determine how large 
the external share of total accident costs is. One approach stems from the well- known 
handbook Korzhenevych et al. (2014) which uses an estimate of the internalized cost 
share. This is obtained by “dividing the number of fatalities inside a certain type of vehicle 
by the number of fatalities in accidents involving this vehicle type” (see Korzhenevych 
et al., 2014, p.21). This way, the guide estimates the share of internal costs for passenger 
cars at 76% of total accident costs. Under this classification, I arrive at the composition 
of net private/ external benefits from the speed limit policy as shown in TABLE 8–1.  
                                                 
 
73 For the fuel price, I use the average price for diesel / gasoline observed at gas stations in 2012. These are 
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TABLE 8–1: CALCULATION OF PRIVATE NET BENEFITS. 
  H1G H2G 
Private Costs Travel Time -5,029,905.79 € -13,065,704.94 € 
Private Benefits Internal share of accident savings 2,763,352.87 € 2,671,880.79 € 
 Fuel economy 7,047,400.39 € 14,083,437.50 € 
Net Private Benefits 4,780,847.47 € 3,689,613.35 € 
Source: own table and calculations.  
 
It is an unforeseen result, that on both highways also the private assessment results in 
positive benefits. The key driver here is the fuel price, as private fuel economy amounts 
to the largest share of benefits.74 Indeed, under the assumptions made here, the fuel sav-
ings alone compensate for the time opportunity costs, which would be an interesting 
trade-off to be analyzed in more depth in the future.  
Obtaining a positive estimate of private benefits means that also from the private perspec-
tive, driving slower would be favorable. At first sight, this would imply irrational behav-
ior of the transport users. However, given that it is not feasible to capture all potential 
impacts on a highway user’s utility, this shall not be claimed as a general implication 
from the analysis.75 Apart from other potential impacts which are likely to drive this find-
ing, it is also possible, that imperfect information of the highway users is a cause for this 
effect. It is well conceivable that travelers do not exactly know, how much fuel (which is 
the major private benefit here) they save long term, from driving slower. It is even more 
realistic, that there is a broad underestimation of accident risk, which is causing irration-
ally high speeds. Also, people often overestimate the time savings they can achieve from 
speeding, which has been elaborated on by Tscharaktschiew, (2016). All of this may lead 
to a suboptimal speed choice from a private perspective and subsequently to a suboptimal 
speed choice from the social perspective. This supports the result that from a perspective 
of welfare maximization, a speed limit on highways in Germany may be desirable.  
It is finally noteworthy that the annual private benefits estimated here are even higher 
than the social net benefits calculated above. Since all costs in the scenario stem from 
travel time increases, which are purely private, this effect is due to the higher fuel price 
from the private point of view. This shows, that the results from the relatively limited 
case study here are of course sensitive to the assumptions made and parameters defined 
along the way. Therefore, I perform sensitivity analysis on the central result for the social 
net benefits by investigating key parameters in the next section. 
                                                 
 
74 Indeed, when calculating with the net of taxes fuel price, H2G private benefits turn negative.  
75 Further potential impacts, which are not covered in the main analysis, will be noted in the sensitivity 
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8.2 Sensitivity Analysis  
8.2.1 Quantitative Sensitivity Analysis – What if?  
Theoretically, one could shuffle every parameter and tighten or loosen any assumption 
made in the CBA, to account for the uncertainty accompanying these necessities. Practi-
cally, however, I want to focus on core parameters and assumptions, which have the po-
tential of altering the decision made above and could turn the calculated annual benefits 
into a negative number.  
Travel time is the only cost component in the analysis and thus the first impact to perform 
sensitivity analysis on. Two aspects are crucial; the difference in travel speeds between 
Germany and the Netherlands and the VoT. With respect to the former, I calculate net 
benefits using the maximum of observed annual differences instead of the mean. Thus, 
assuming a decrease in mean speeds of -3.54 km/h for H1G, the net benefits then are re-
duced to 3,245,981.29 € but overall the policy remains welfare increasing. On H2G the 
maximum is a large decrease of -9.09 km/h, which turns annual social benefits negative 
to -449,930.34 €. In order to equate benefits and costs, mean speeds would – ceteris pari-
bus – need to decrease to roughly 88 km/h on H1G and to 115 km/h on H2G.76 88km/h is 
below the 3rd percentile of H1G and more importantly also below the 2
nd percentile of H2N 
and thus a highly implausible speed level to be provoked by adopting the foreign speed 
limit policy. 115 km/h on H2G is somewhat more reasonable and the maximum speed 
difference observed per year would actually drag mean speeds below this value.77 Here, 
it is visible that the predicted magnitude for this impact is of supreme importance when 
making deciding about the desirability of the policy. However, due to the particularities 
in the accident analysis, road security benefits are likely to be underestimated on H2G. 
This mitigates the sensitive results for Highway 2 where, despite much higher speed dif-
ferentials, the accident rates per vehicle kilometer had to be assumed to be identical to 
those on H1G. In fact, these should be higher and would likely contribute to compensation 
of the large time opportunity costs.  
Because non-business travel time accounts for the major share of time opportunity costs, 
I also calculate the hourly break-even VoT for non-business travel. This means, again, 
that net benefits are zero when this VoT were true, holding other factors constant. For 
H1G the VoT that equates benefits and costs is 20.70 €/h. This value is not only outside of 
the range presented as applicable in BMVI, (2016b) but also much higher than the average 
                                                 
 
76 This means, that I search for the target value of mean speed, which sets benefits equal to cost, holding all 
other impacts constant (ceteris paribus). Another interpretation often found in sensitivity analyses is that a 
parameter sets the benefit- cost ratio to parity, which is equivalent to net benefits of 0. 
77 Initial mean speeds on H2G were 123.73 km/h. The maximum annual difference to the Dutch Highway 
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hourly net wage in Germany, exceeding it by more than 100%.78 Thus, this value seems 
out of the reasonable range for non-business travel time. The break-even VoT on H2G is 
considerably lower at 11.67€. This is still a high value but could be considered in the 
range of plausible values as it is at least covered in the range presented in BMVI, (2016b). 
Again, the results of Highway 2 are found to be less robust. Overall, the VoT needs to 
increase to the top of the plausible range to alter the positive policy decision.  
A natural parameter to perform sensitivity analysis on is the VSL as it is a parameter 
subject to much debate. However, in the present case, the contribution of a reduction in 
fatal accidents to social benefits is very small due to the marginal differences observed in 
fatalities. I therefore do not analyze this input parameter in more detail.  
With respect to fuel consumption, the price is the only input value, which is market de-
termined and hence not subject to much uncertainty. Merely the input prices net of taxes 
are subject to a slight adjustment by the authors of BMVI, (2016b). When using the orig-
inal prices observed, this increases net benefits slightly as the fuel prices are raised a 
touch.79  
Regarding the emissions calculations there are a few arguments explaining why expected 
benefits could be significantly lower, especially since PM emissions are certainly under-
estimated because only tailpipe emissions are included. It is known from the literature 
presented in Chapter 2 that PM emissions stem largely from abrasion.80 A point of dis-
cussion may be the interpolation of speed-emission figures from the discrete emission 
factors by speed level. This means I do not observe exact emission factors for speeds 
above 130 km/h but extrapolate the fitted functions. Since several speed percentiles are 
above 130 km/h, this may have impacts on the calculated emission reductions especially 
for the higher percentiles. The UBA provides a single average value per emission item to 
be applied for speeds above 130 km/h.81 Indeed, when applying this fixed factor for higher 
speeds, the emission results change significantly, dragging net benefits on H1G below 1 
million € and H2G benefits into a slightly negative range. However, applying a fixed emis-
sion value on all speeds above 130 km/h does clearly underestimate the impacts in this 
case. This is essentially equal to omitting all speed differentials for percentile values 
above 130 km/h in the valuation. Yet, as evident from FIGURE 6-8, this does not reflect 
the increasing speed gap at the top 20 - 30% of the speed distribution. Consequently, the 
largest emission impacts are neglected, for which reason my estimates appear more accu-
rate and are preferred in the analysis here. 
                                                 
 
78 For example, in 2012 the average monthly salary net of taxes in Germany was 1,684 € (see Statista 2018). 
Based on a 40 h week and 4.3 weeks per month this corresponds to a net hourly wage of 9.79 €.  
79 Original prices are 0.722 € for Gasoline and 0.787 € for Diesel. (See Table 26 in BMVI 2016b). 
80 See literature review and again European Environment Agency (2016)  
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8.2.2 Qualitative Sensitivity Analysis – Other potential impacts 
Like every CBA, this analysis abstracts from other transport impacts that potentially in-
fluence an individual’s utility. This section briefly addresses other potential impacts 
which have not been included quantitatively. It is started with additional conceivable so-
cial costs from a general speed limit policy in Germany, which may counteract the find-
ings.  
 
Investment and transaction costs 
The analysis abstracts from initial investment costs such as parliament debate and opera-
tive implementation of the policy. With the possibility of running a public communica-
tions campaign to introduce the policy, operative maintenance costs such as setting up 
new traffic signs should be small. Public and parliament debate as well as further publicly 
funded studies for decision-making would expectedly lead to several millions in social 
costs. These are, however, initial costs likely to be offset by the consecutive annual ben-
efits given the long-time horizon of such a policy.  
 
Image for German car manufacturers and demand reduction  
The unlimited highways may provide a competitive advantage for German car manufac-
turers by creating the image their cars were “Autobahn approved”, especially for foreign 
customers. This could work as a signaling effect and leverage car sales, which may de-
crease if speed laws were amended. This potential impact is not easily quantifiable and – 
as noted by a group of German traffic research professors – is not to be favored over road 
safety from an ethical perspective (see Universitätsprofessoren des Verkehrswesens, 
2004, p.3).  
 
Joy of driving fast and Highway tourism 
There will be people with a certain willingness to pay for the pleasure they experience 
when speeding on the German highway. Eliminating the possibility of legally doing this, 
would thus also constitute a social cost.82 In addition, several foreigners travel to Ger-
many with the distinct aim of driving a fast car on the German Autobahn. Their utility 
from enjoying the highway ride and the money they spend on domestically produced 
goods and services could be included in a CBA. In contrast, many road users on the public 
                                                 
 
82 It is debatable whether these preferences should be given standing in a CBA. Veisten et al. (2013) for 
example, discuss the appropriateness of giving standing to the people’s utility from violating traffic laws. 
The joy of driving fast is not an identical case but due to the high (external) risks of excessive speeds 
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highways may feel intimidated and are put into danger, which is neutralizing this potential 
cost item. This was also noted in Universitätsprofessoren des Verkehrswesens (2004). 
On the other hand, there are several impacts that could be of additional benefit and would 
exacerbate the positive welfare effects from a speed limit.  
 
Travel time reliability  
The time lost when traveling slower could be offset partially by an increase in travel time 
reliability. Reliability can be evaluated by a before-after comparison of travel time vari-
ance. So far, this impact is rarely quantified in CBA (see Elvik, 2001, p.15) but there are 
approaches for estimating the value of reliability (VoR) for Germany.83 Given the clear 
reductions in standard deviations of speed observed in the present data, one may find 
considerable improvements in travel time reliability, which may lead to noteworthy wel-
fare gains. 
 
Marginal excess tax burden 
I do not estimate welfare increases from the marginal excess tax burden (METB) which 
is avoided when fuel consumption decreases. Since the fuel price consumers need to pay 
is highly distorted by taxes, a demand reduction in fuel results in deadweight loss- savings 
from the sum of these transactions. 
 
Further Downsizing 
Without the possibility of extremely high speeds the long run car engine sizes and thereby 
fuel consumption and emissions are to decrease further. The general notion of “downsiz-
ing” in the car industry may be expected to be accelerated as a speed limit can set incen-
tives for diverting innovation in the automotive industry towards higher fuel efficiency 
(see Universitätsprofessoren des Verkehrswesens, 2004, p.2). 
 
Property damage accidents 
It is also abstracted from accidents with property damage only. As shown in Section 6.3, 
this accident category constitutes a high share of total accidents. This category could re-
sult in either additional private benefits or costs, as it is unclear whether these low-sever-
ity accidents are increased or decreased.  
                                                 
 
83 TNS Infratest /IVT /ETH Zürich (2015) estimate the WTP for reductions in travel time standard-devia-
tions that can be used in German transport project appraisals.  
Political Implications  
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9 POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS 
The analysis finds that a speed limit on the two German highway sections would be ben-
eficial to society from both the benevolent planner and the private perspective. This find-
ing is shown to be more robust for the German part of Highway 1 (i.e. the highway km 0 
to 79 of the German A61 (H1G). The finding of positive welfare effects on the Highway 
2 section are to a certain degree sensitive to the assumptions made. In particular, this is 
due to higher variance in the permanently posted speed limits, which made the analysis 
more difficult and made it necessary to adopt the accident results from Highway 1 despite 
speed differences on H1 being considerably smaller. However, even with the anticipated 
underestimation of road safety benefits, the numbers for Highway 2 point in the same 
direction, which makes the results somewhat more robust.  
What does this finding mean for Germany as a whole? As an experiment of thought, the 
net benefits of Highway 1 (4,426,978 € per year at 158 distance-km) can be scaled up for 
the entire German highway system. If the roughly 18,037 unlimited highway km were 
subject to a 130 km/h speed limit, the findings translate into a countrywide annual net 
benefit of 505 mio €. Of course, this case study is of relatively limited scope. Therefore, 
the representativeness for the German highway net is not given. For example, a large 
share of the German highway net has three lanes per direction, which may produce dif-
ferent results. The morphological constitution across Germany differs as well, which pre-
dictably changes speed distributions and accident rates. Speed limit compositions can also 
be different. Consequently, producing reliable estimates of welfare impacts from general 
speed limits on the country-level is a very complex task and requires further research.  
If a speed limit was to be implemented, inevitably the question of the optimal level 
arises.84 While it is not in scope of this thesis to answer this question it was pointed out 
that the level matters significantly for public acceptance. In theory one can identify an 
optimal limit by maximizing the net benefits as a function of the speed limit. Determining 
a continuous social benefits function is a highly interesting, but demanding task.  
Given the analysis above, it is likely that also on the federal level, the Germany society 
could benefit from a general speed limit on highways. To support future research, it would 
be highly recommendable to improve data access and transparency. As it is pointed out 
in this thesis, collecting data was a considerable effort, especially in Germany. A consol-
idated road database similar to the system set up in the Netherlands would certainly be of 
                                                 
 
84 A theoretical model to calculate optimal speed limits has, e.g. been developed by Jondrow et al. (1983) 
who introduce a standard neoclassical model to the problem, based on typical assumptions like homogenous 
(e.g. the same optimal private speed for all) and fully informed agents (e.g. knowledge about value of time 
and accident probability). They develop a model for the standard trade-off between travel time and safety 
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high value for the German road safety research and other topics in transport research. This 
applies at least to two dimensions; speed measurement data on the one side and detailed 
speed limit overviews on the other. Up to now, it appears that both is subject to a political 
momentousness, which causes hurdles to research projects.   
10  CONCLUSION 
In this thesis, I analyzed the impact of a general speed limit of 130 km/h for passenger 
cars on two highway sections in the federal state of North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany. 
Travel speed and accident data were used to quantify the social welfare impacts on travel 
time, accident victims, fuel consumption and emissions. In the central case, I conclude 
that on both highways the speed limit would be beneficial from the social and private 
perspective. The latter result indicates a certain irrationality in the speed choice of the 
highway travelers, which can be explained by omitted impact factors on the utility of 
highway users as well as time-savings misperceptions from speeding. The former leads 
to the question whether these findings can be extrapolated from the case study to the 
highway net in Germany as a whole. This cannot be claimed as the highway system at the 
national level can vary in many dimensions such as lanes, curvature, slopes etc., which 
potentially alters the effects. Additionally, the impacts found on the two highways differ 
in magnitude. However, the qualitative decisions are identical and sufficiently robust to 
their core assumptions. Furthermore, the present work demonstrates a roadmap of how to 
evaluate several cost and benefit categories consistently and provides a broad overview 
of relevant literature as well as further potential impacts to be covered.  
Next, it is to be asked, why Germany sticks to its exceptional no-speed limit policy. Two 
core reasons for this may be the existing research gap and political importance of the 
topic. Improving the limited possibilities of obtaining data on travel speeds and detailed 
speed limit overviews can help fostering independent research on the topic.      
Many interesting aspects could be covered in future research. The accident analysis has 
discovered the need for larger scale analysis of speed limit impacts on accidents in Ger-
many. A very interesting question arose about the private trade-off between travel-time 
savings and fuel consumption, which targets the question under which assumptions about 
the VoT and fuel prices speeding leads to private welfare gains. Moreover, the sensitivity 
analysis has exposed several further impacts, which are not covered here but can be ana-
lyzed and estimated. Studies of larger scale would improve the reliability in assessing the 
social desirability of speed limits on a federal level. There are many questions to be tar-
geted and indeed – in the case of speed, there may be a lot to gain from implementing a 
limit. Speed appears to be one of the rare cases, where restrictions are preferable over free 
choice. 
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Appendix 1: Illustration of a two- lane highway (birds view and cross-section). 
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Appendix 2: A snapshot on maximum speeds in Europe. 
GENERAL PASSENGER CAR SPEED LIMITS IN EUROPE, 2017 (IN KM/H) 
Country Urban areas Rural roads Motorways 
Austria   50 100 130 
Belgium   30-50 70-90 120 
Czech Republic   50 90 130 
Denmark  50 80 130 (110 for certain 
sections) 
Finland      50 (sections with 30, 
40, or 60) 
100 (80 in winter) 120 (100 near cities) 
France   50 90 (80 in wet weather, 
for novice drivers) 
130 (110 in wet 
weather and for novice 
drivers) 
Germany  50 100 None (130 recom-
mended) 
Greece  50 90   130 
Hungary   50 90 130 (110 on ”motor 
roads”) 
Iceland  50 90 (paved roads) 






<=60 (can be 60 on 
arterial roads,    
30 in built up areas) 
80, 100 120 
Italy    
 
50 70-90 (110 on some 
main dual carriage-
ways) 
130 (110 in wet 
weather, 100 for nov-
ice drivers.  
Motorway operator 
may increase speed 
limit up  
to 150 if stringent re-
quirements are met) 
Lithuania  50 90 (70 on gravel roads 
and for novice drivers) 
120,130 (110 in win-
ter, 90 for novice driv-
ers) 
Luxembourg  50 90 130 (110 in wet 
weather) 
Netherlands   30-50 60-80 100*-130 
Norway   50 (30 on residential 
streets) 
80 90,100,110 
Poland   50 (60 at nighttime) 90, 100, 120 140 
Portugal  50 90 120 
Serbia   50 80, 100   120 
Slovenia   50 90 (110 on express-
ways) 
130 
Spain  50 90,100 120 
Sweden  30, 40, 50 60,70,80,90,100 110,120 
Switzerland  50 80 120 
United Kingdom     48 (30 mph) 96, 113 (60, 70 mph) 113 (70 mph) 
Note: The table provides an overview of the speed limits for passenger cars of the subsample of 
European member countries of the International Traffic Safety Data and Analysis Group (IRTAD).  
* Applies to so-called through roads, which do not fully meet the standards of highways. For reg-
ular motorways the limit is 130 km/h. (see same source as below, Table 27.7 on p. 378). 
Source: Adapted from (ITF, 2017), p. 28.  
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Appendix 3: 2012 speed limit changes in the Netherlands. 
 











Appendix 5: Boxplot graph of the elevation profile per highway section. 
 
Note:  Slopes are calculated as 1000m intervals. The short additional bar within each plot represents the mean slope 
per highway section.  







H1G H1N H2G H2N





Descriptive elevation statistics of selected highways
I tried to obtain data on two central aspects from the German federal highway research 
institute “Bundesanstalt für Straßenwesen” (BASt). Firstly, I requested measurement 
data on real driving speeds in any possible format. Surprisingly, the institute itself does 
not collect data on real driving speeds at all. Attached to the response I received the 
work of Kellermann (1995), who uses historical measurement data to determine rela-
tionships between speed and traffic volume in order to infer to the speed distribution 
in the (West German) highway system in 1992. Analyses that are more current are not 
available within the BASt. In line with (Molitor 2017) I find that there exists no official 
institution in Germany that centrally collects data on driving speeds. Secondly, it was 
necessary to receive an overview of posted speed limits on the highways in question. 
The federal (BASt) had requested such data from the federal states in 2015. In the final 
report it is noted that due to the political importance of the discussion on speed limits, 
the federal states have linked the provision of detailed speed limit data to the condition 
that sharing of the data is only permitted at a highly aggregated level (see Kollmus et 
al. 2017). According to the same report, a detailed analysis on state (or even highway) 
level or of the order reasons is not possible.   
Appendix 4: Data collection at German federal level hardly possible. 
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Appendix 6: Hourly and annual average daily traffic counts by highway, 2015-2017. 















AADT (HXG - 
HXN)        




Lane 2 458,398 469.5907 2518 
 
Sum 916,905 1,011 
 
     
 
H2N Lane 1 683,826 679.7444 2735 
47708 
 
Lane 2 578,622 314.1644 2840  
Sum 1,262,448 994 
 
     
  




Lane 2 264,908 381.4018 2384 
 
Sum 530,944 860 
 
     
 
H1N Lane 1 315,612 466.1841 2880 
47099 
 
Lane 2 368,214 515.0554 1440  
Sum 683,826 981 
 
Note: In the data, I observe individual traffic counts by hour, by direction and lane for a given high-
way. The table provides mean traffic counts over all three years by highway by lane. Since the 
AADT includes all directions and lanes, traffic counts per lane per hour are added up and multiplied 
by 2 (directions) * 24 in order to provide an estimate of average daily traffic. Doing so assumes con-
stant traffic for both directions for a given measurement point, which is necessary since most of the 
measurement stations only depict one direction.  
(The minor deviations of the AADT figures when replicated from the table are due to rounded hourly 
mean values.)   























Summary statistics of collected speed data (all stations). 
Panel 1: mean speeds and 85th percentile speeds by highway for the years 2015-2017 (km/h) 
 
 



























H2G 124.409 137.466 123.310 135.792 123.476 136.703  
(16.685) (11.260) (16.758) (12.735) (17.023) (12.014) 
 
305802 311020 304906 311742 293400 294630 
       
H2N 112.376 120.661 113.173 122.196 113.814 123.239  
(14.258) (6.677) (15.082) (8.357) (15.029) (8.342) 
 
328313 397669 308338 363105 344646 406297 
 








H1G 121.777 131.208 122.099 131.641 120.299 130.560  
(13.380) (10.989) (13.848) (11.718) (14.113) (10.444) 
 
175560 179640 169509 175012 173655 177643 
       
H1N 118.851 125.943 118.563 126.326 118.121 126.466  
(9.372) (3.876) (11.465) (5.236) (12.202) (5.612) 
 
201684 213530 203601 207768 197948 200856 
 
      
  
Panel 2: differences in mean speeds and 85th percentile speeds as well as their respective std. Dev.     
H2G-H2N 
Mean -12.033 -16.804 -10.137 -13.596 -9.662 -13.464 
Std. Dev. -2.426 -4.583 -1.675 -4.378 -1.994 -3.672 
 
       
H1G-H1N 
Mean -2.926 -5.265 -3.537 -5.315 -2.178 -4.094 
Std. Dev. -4.008 -7.114 -2.383 -6.482 -1.911 -4.832 
Note:  Panel 1 reports means speeds and 85th percentile speed by year and highway. Standard deviations 
written in brackets, the third line for each highway is the number of observations. Mean speeds are yearly 
averages over hourly observations while I have daily values per station for the 85th percentile which is 
then averaged per year and highway. All available stations are included. Panel 2 calculates differences 
between the German and the Dutch value for mean speeds and 85th percentile as well as their corre-
sponding standard errors.  
Source: Own table based on data as cited in 6.1.4. 
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Appendix 10: Scatter Plot and correlation of mean speed to traffic intensity (all vehicles) 
by highway, 2015-2017. 
 
 







Top Speeds and traffic intensities  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
       
H1G Mean Speed 24 207.8333 9.946232 200 232 
Vehicle Count  24 1.791667 1.141287 1 5 
H2G Mean Speed 48 209.0625 11.20298 200 250 
Vehicle Count  48 2.333333 1.226192 1 5 
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Appendix 11: Mean hourly traffic intensity by highway, 2015-2017 average. 
 
 
Appendix 12: Number of reported category 4 accidents (property damage only) over time. 
 
 
Note: The graph demonstrates the number of reported category 4 accidents (property damage) 
irrespective of speed limit on H1G (light grey) and H2G (dark grey) over time. The graph shows 
a sharp incline in reported property damage accidents after 2008 when police officers in North 
Rhine-Westphalia were obliged to report them. The initial steep rise is partially offset in the fol-
lowing years, which may be due to a general time trend. However, the accident counts in the 
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Appendix 13: Annual total counts of accidents and victims per highway and year by se-
verity category.  
 
Annual total accident and victim counts  
Fatal Serious Injury Light Injury Total  
Acc. Pers. Acc. Pers. Acc. Pers. Acc. Pers. 
H1G 
        
PHASE 1 3 (3) 69 (81) 140 (238) 212 (322) 
2016 1 (1) 16 (24) 39 (70) 56 (95) 
2015 0 (0) 14 (15) 35 (50) 49 (65) 
2014 1 (1) 17 (17) 35 (62) 53 (80) 
2013 1 (1) 18 (21) 27 (50) 46 (72) 
2012 (Q4) 
  
4 (4) 4 (6) 8 (10)  
PHASE 2 9 (10) 121 (152) 267 (449) 397 (611) 
2012 (Q1-3) 1 (1) 8 (12) 23 (43) 32 (56) 
2011 3 (4) 17 (18) 28 (39) 48 (61) 
2010 1 (1) 21 (23) 34 (56) 56 (80) 
2009 1 (1) 10 (14) 25 (48) 36 (63) 
2008 3 (3) 17 (19) 34 (71) 54 (93) 
2007 0 (0) 19 (29) 39 (57) 58 (86) 
2006 0 (0 19 (26) 47 (73) 66 (99) 
2005 0 (0 10 (11) 37 (62) 47 (73)  
H1N 
        
PHASE 1 3 (3) 21 (29) 12 (16) 36 (48) 
2016 0 (0) 12 (18) 6 (7) 18 (25) 
2015 2 (2) 9 (11) 1 (3) 12 (16) 
2014 1 (1) 0 (0) 5 (6) 6 (7)  
PHASE 2 13 17) 65 (88) 53 (87) 131 (192) 
2012 (Q1-3) 1 (1) 0 (0) 2 (2) 3 (3) 
2011 2 (3) 0 (0) 
 
(1) 2 (4) 
2010 0 (0) 3 (3) 1 (3) 4 (6) 
2009 0 (0) 13 (18) 7 (12) 20 (30) 
2008 2 (5) 11 (12) 9 (16) 22 (33) 
2007 2 (2) 8 (9) 10 (20) 20 (31) 
2006 0 (0) 19 (25) 11 (16) 30 (41) 
2005 6 (6) 11 (21) 13 (17) 30 (44) 
TOTAL 28 (33) 276 (350) 472 (790) 776 (1173) 
Note: The table lists total accident and victim figures by highway by severity category for each 
year. The persons do not need to correspond directly to accidents of the same category. Traffic 
fatalities of course need to belong to a fatal accident. Severely injured people can be attributed 
to either fatal or severe injury accidents. Light injured people to either category 
Source: Own table based on accident data as described in section 6.1.4.   
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Appendix 14: Speed percentiles by highway, in km/h (average 2015-2017). 
Percentile  
(Upper Bound) 
H1G H1N H2G H2N 
1 81.00 77.21 81.00 45.74 
2 87.00 100.00 89.00 71.41 
3 92.00 103.82 92.00 82.68 
4 97.00 105.53 95.00 90.42 
5 100.00 106.63 97.00 94.49 
6 103.00 107.46 99.00 97.00 
7 105.00 108.12 101.00 99.12 
8 106.00 108.69 102.00 100.84 
9 107.00 109.19 103.00 102.25 
10 108.00 109.63 104.00 103.46 
11 108.00 110.02 105.00 104.48 
12 109.00 110.39 105.00 105.29 
13 109.00 110.74 106.00 105.97 
14 110.00 111.07 107.00 106.57 
15 110.00 111.39 108.00 107.09 
16 111.00 111.70 108.00 107.56 
17 111.00 111.99 109.00 108.00 
18 112.00 112.27 110.00 108.40 
19 112.00 112.55 110.00 108.78 
20 112.00 112.82 111.00 109.15 
21 113.00 113.08 112.00 109.50 
22 113.00 113.34 112.00 109.86 
23 113.00 113.59 113.00 110.19 
24 114.00 113.84 113.00 110.52 
25 114.00 114.07 114.00 110.85 
26 114.00 114.30 114.00 111.17 
27 115.00 114.53 115.00 111.50 
28 115.00 114.75 115.00 111.82 
29 115.00 114.97 116.00 112.13 
30 115.00 115.18 116.00 112.44 
31 116.00 115.38 117.00 112.77 
32 116.00 115.58 117.00 113.05 
33 116.00 115.77 118.00 113.35 
34 117.00 115.95 118.00 113.64 
35 117.00 116.13 118.00 113.92 
36 117.00 116.32 119.00 114.19 
37 118.00 116.49 119.00 114.47 
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38 118.00 116.66 119.00 114.75 
39 118.00 116.83 120.00 115.00 
40 119.00 116.99 120.00 115.28 
41 119.00 117.14 121.00 115.55 
42 119.00 117.30 121.00 115.82 
43 119.00 117.46 121.00 116.09 
44 120.00 117.62 122.00 116.36 
45 120.00 117.78 122.00 116.64 
46 120.00 117.93 122.00 116.91 
47 120.00 118.08 123.00 117.17 
48 121.00 118.23 123.00 117.45 
49 121.00 118.38 123.00 117.73 
50 121.00 118.53 124.00 118.00 
51 122.00 118.69 124.00 118.29 
52 122.00 118.84 124.00 118.58 
53 122.00 119.00 125.00 118.86 
54 122.00 119.16 125.00 119.15 
55 123.00 119.32 125.00 119.44 
56 123.00 119.47 126.00 119.74 
57 123.00 119.64 126.00 120.01 
58 123.00 119.81 126.00 120.31 
59 124.00 119.98 127.00 120.61 
60 124.00 120.15 127.00 120.91 
61 124.00 120.33 128.00 121.21 
62 124.00 120.51 128.00 121.50 
63 125.00 120.70 128.00 121.80 
64 125.00 120.90 129.00 122.07 
65 125.00 121.10 129.00 122.35 
66 126.00 121.31 130.00 122.63 
67 126.00 121.54 130.00 122.90 
68 126.00 121.78 130.00 123.16 
69 127.00 122.02 131.00 123.41 
70 127.00 122.30 131.00 123.68 
71 127.00 122.59 132.00 123.94 
72 128.00 122.90 133.00 124.19 
73 128.00 123.22 133.00 124.45 
74 129.00 123.57 134.00 124.70 
75 129.00 123.95 134.00 124.95 
76 129.00 124.35 135.00 125.18 
77 130.00 124.76 136.00 125.43 
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78 130.00 125.15 136.00 125.68 
79 131.00 125.56 137.00 125.92 
80 132.00 125.98 138.00 126.17 
81 132.00 126.40 138.00 126.42 
82 133.00 126.81 139.00 126.67 
83 133.00 127.18 140.00 126.93 
84 134.00 127.58 141.00 127.17 
85 135.00 127.96 141.00 127.45 
86 135.00 128.35 142.00 127.72 
87 136.00 128.73 143.00 128.01 
88 137.00 129.11 144.00 128.32 
89 138.00 129.51 144.00 128.65 
90 138.00 129.92 145.00 129.00 
91 139.00 130.32 146.00 129.36 
92 140.00 130.79 147.00 129.76 
93 141.00 131.27 148.00 130.20 
94 142.00 131.83 149.00 130.74 
95 144.00 132.44 151.00 131.37 
96 145.00 133.23 152.00 132.10 
97 147.00 134.25 154.00 133.17 
98 149.00 135.97 156.00 134.85 
99 152.00 139.51 160.00 138.12 
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CO: y = 0.0011x
2
 - 0.1919x + 8.9383 (R² = 0.9848) 
CO2: y = 0.0278x
2
 - 4.4762x + 309.02 (R² = 0.9877) 
FC: y = 0.01x
2
 - 1.6033x + 110.69 (R² = 0.9877) 
HC: y = 7E-06x
2
 - 0.0012x + 0.0628 (R² = 0.98) 
NOx: y = 4E-05x
2
 - 0.0064x + 0.3368 (R² = 0.977) 
PM: y = 3E-06x
2
 - 0.0005x + 0.0209 (R² = 0.9983) 
 
Diesel    
CO: y = 2E-06x
2
 - 0.0006x + 0.0521 (R² = 0.8033) 
CO2: y = 0.0131x
2
 - 2.0968x + 194.6 (R² = 0.9771) 
FC: y = 0.0047x
2
 - 0.7536x + 69.94 (R² = 0.9771)  
HC: y = 8E-07x
2
 - 0.0002x + 0.019 (R² = 0.9224) 
NOx: y = 0.0003x
2
 - 0.0508x + 2.6775 (R² = 0.9828) 
PM: y = 2E-06x
2
 - 0.0003x + 0.0223 (R² = 0.9934)  
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Appendix 16: Central case changes in emissions and fuel consumption by percentile, by highway and fuel type (g/vkm). 
Percentile Gasoline Diesel 
Highway 1 FC CO2 CO HC NOx PM FC CO2 CO HC NOx PM 
1 0.08009 0.25108 0.06763 0.00035 0.00027 0.00010 0.03783 0.12025 0.00107 0.00028 0.01263 -0.00006 
2 3.46710 10.86936 0.17940 0.00142 0.01404 0.00079 1.62890 5.17827 -0.00294 -0.00066 0.06890 0.00096 
3 4.19596 13.15433 0.27787 0.00202 0.01694 0.00103 1.97152 6.26747 -0.00246 -0.00051 0.09395 0.00108 
4 3.59936 11.28398 0.26341 0.00186 0.01451 0.00092 1.69128 5.37658 -0.00166 -0.00032 0.08494 0.00090 
5 3.06853 9.61983 0.23456 0.00163 0.01236 0.00079 1.44188 4.58374 -0.00124 -0.00023 0.07415 0.00075 
6 2.23465 7.00563 0.17655 0.00122 0.00900 0.00059 1.05007 3.33817 -0.00080 -0.00014 0.05500 0.00054 
7 1.64688 5.16297 0.13269 0.00091 0.00663 0.00043 0.77388 2.46017 -0.00054 -0.00009 0.04098 0.00039 
8 1.46377 4.58891 0.11918 0.00082 0.00589 0.00039 0.68784 2.18664 -0.00046 -0.00008 0.03664 0.00035 
9 1.22618 3.84407 0.10078 0.00069 0.00493 0.00033 0.57620 1.83173 -0.00037 -0.00006 0.03086 0.00029 
10 0.93169 2.92085 0.07722 0.00053 0.00375 0.00025 0.43782 1.39182 -0.00027 -0.00004 0.02356 0.00022 
11 1.16343 3.64734 0.09664 0.00066 0.00468 0.00031 0.54671 1.73800 -0.00033 -0.00005 0.02946 0.00027 
12 0.81852 2.56605 0.06850 0.00047 0.00329 0.00022 0.38463 1.22275 -0.00022 -0.00003 0.02081 0.00019 
13 1.03508 3.24497 0.08679 0.00059 0.00416 0.00028 0.48640 1.54627 -0.00028 -0.00004 0.02635 0.00024 
14 0.64905 2.03478 0.05479 0.00037 0.00261 0.00017 0.30500 0.96960 -0.00017 -0.00002 0.01659 0.00015 
15 0.84686 2.65491 0.07160 0.00049 0.00341 0.00023 0.39796 1.26510 -0.00022 -0.00003 0.02166 0.00020 
16 0.43621 1.36752 0.03712 0.00025 0.00175 0.00012 0.20499 0.65165 -0.00011 -0.00002 0.01120 0.00010 
17 0.61855 1.93916 0.05270 0.00036 0.00249 0.00017 0.29067 0.92404 -0.00015 -0.00002 0.01589 0.00014 
18 0.17302 0.54243 0.01483 0.00010 0.00070 0.00005 0.08131 0.25848 -0.00004 -0.00001 0.00446 0.00004 
19 0.35055 1.09899 0.03008 0.00020 0.00141 0.00009 0.16473 0.52369 -0.00008 -0.00001 0.00904 0.00008 
20 0.52732 1.65314 0.04530 0.00031 0.00212 0.00014 0.24780 0.78775 -0.00012 -0.00002 0.01361 0.00012 
21 0.05155 0.16160 0.00445 0.00003 0.00021 0.00001 0.02422 0.07701 -0.00001 0.00000 0.00133 0.00001 
22 0.22344 0.70048 0.01932 0.00013 0.00090 0.00006 0.10500 0.33379 -0.00005 -0.00001 0.00579 0.00005 
23 0.39120 1.22642 0.03386 0.00023 0.00157 0.00011 0.18384 0.58441 -0.00009 -0.00001 0.01014 0.00009 
24 -0.11071 -0.34708 -0.00963 -0.00006 -0.00045 -0.00003 -0.05203 -0.16539 0.00002 0.00000 -0.00288 -0.00003 
25 0.04640 0.14547 0.00404 0.00003 0.00019 0.00001 0.02181 0.06932 -0.00001 0.00000 0.00121 0.00001 
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Percentile Gasoline Diesel 
Highway 1 FC CO2 CO HC NOx PM FC CO2 CO HC NOx PM 
26 0.20569 0.64482 0.01792 0.00012 0.00083 0.00006 0.09666 0.30727 -0.00004 -0.00001 0.00535 0.00005 
27 -0.32538 -1.02006 -0.02849 -0.00019 -0.00131 -0.00009 -0.15290 -0.48608 0.00007 0.00001 -0.00849 -0.00007 
28 -0.17244 -0.54061 -0.01511 -0.00010 -0.00069 -0.00005 -0.08104 -0.25761 0.00003 0.00000 -0.00450 -0.00004 
29 -0.01950 -0.06113 -0.00171 -0.00001 -0.00008 -0.00001 -0.00916 -0.02913 0.00000 0.00000 -0.00051 0.00000 
30 0.12237 0.38363 0.01074 0.00007 0.00049 0.00003 0.05750 0.18281 -0.00002 0.00000 0.00320 0.00003 
31 -0.44065 -1.38144 -0.03884 -0.00026 -0.00177 -0.00012 -0.20708 -0.65829 0.00009 0.00001 -0.01154 -0.00010 
32 -0.30003 -0.94059 -0.02646 -0.00018 -0.00121 -0.00008 -0.14099 -0.44822 0.00006 0.00001 -0.00786 -0.00007 
33 -0.16688 -0.52315 -0.01473 -0.00010 -0.00067 -0.00005 -0.07842 -0.24930 0.00003 0.00000 -0.00438 -0.00004 
34 -0.76058 -2.38441 -0.06739 -0.00045 -0.00306 -0.00021 -0.35742 -1.13624 0.00014 0.00001 -0.01999 -0.00017 
35 -0.62991 -1.97476 -0.05585 -0.00037 -0.00253 -0.00017 -0.29601 -0.94103 0.00012 0.00001 -0.01656 -0.00014 
36 -0.49915 -1.56484 -0.04428 -0.00030 -0.00201 -0.00014 -0.23457 -0.74569 0.00009 0.00001 -0.01313 -0.00011 
37 -1.12025 -3.51199 -0.09976 -0.00067 -0.00450 -0.00031 -0.52644 -1.67357 0.00020 0.00002 -0.02953 -0.00026 
38 -0.99529 -3.12024 -0.08868 -0.00059 -0.00400 -0.00027 -0.46772 -1.48689 0.00017 0.00002 -0.02624 -0.00023 
39 -0.87436 -2.74113 -0.07794 -0.00052 -0.00351 -0.00024 -0.41089 -1.30623 0.00015 0.00001 -0.02306 -0.00020 
40 -1.52091 -4.76806 -0.13607 -0.00091 -0.00611 -0.00042 -0.71473 -2.27213 0.00026 0.00002 -0.04020 -0.00035 
41 -1.40726 -4.41175 -0.12596 -0.00084 -0.00565 -0.00039 -0.66132 -2.10233 0.00024 0.00002 -0.03720 -0.00032 
42 -1.28792 -4.03764 -0.11533 -0.00077 -0.00517 -0.00035 -0.60524 -1.92406 0.00022 0.00002 -0.03406 -0.00029 
43 -1.17054 -3.66963 -0.10487 -0.00070 -0.00470 -0.00032 -0.55008 -1.74870 0.00020 0.00002 -0.03096 -0.00027 
44 -1.83860 -5.76402 -0.16529 -0.00110 -0.00739 -0.00051 -0.86403 -2.74674 0.00030 0.00002 -0.04873 -0.00042 
45 -1.72240 -5.39972 -0.15491 -0.00103 -0.00692 -0.00047 -0.80942 -2.57314 0.00028 0.00002 -0.04566 -0.00039 
46 -1.60760 -5.03984 -0.14465 -0.00096 -0.00646 -0.00044 -0.75547 -2.40165 0.00026 0.00002 -0.04263 -0.00036 
47 -1.49561 -4.68872 -0.13463 -0.00090 -0.00601 -0.00041 -0.70284 -2.23433 0.00024 0.00002 -0.03967 -0.00034 
48 -2.18766 -6.85832 -0.19756 -0.00132 -0.00879 -0.00060 -1.02807 -3.26822 0.00034 0.00002 -0.05814 -0.00049 
49 -2.07218 -6.49628 -0.18721 -0.00125 -0.00832 -0.00057 -0.97380 -3.09570 0.00032 0.00002 -0.05508 -0.00047 
50 -1.95478 -6.12824 -0.17668 -0.00118 -0.00785 -0.00054 -0.91863 -2.92031 0.00030 0.00002 -0.05198 -0.00044 
51 -2.66292 -8.34826 -0.24143 -0.00161 -0.01070 -0.00074 -1.25141 -3.97823 0.00039 0.00002 -0.07094 -0.00060 
52 -2.54079 -7.96538 -0.23046 -0.00153 -0.01020 -0.00070 -1.19402 -3.79578 0.00037 0.00002 -0.06770 -0.00057 
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53 -2.41979 -7.58604 -0.21957 -0.00146 -0.00972 -0.00067 -1.13715 -3.61501 0.00035 0.00002 -0.06449 -0.00055 
54 -2.29635 -7.19906 -0.20846 -0.00139 -0.00922 -0.00063 -1.07915 -3.43061 0.00033 0.00002 -0.06122 -0.00052 
55 -3.01935 -9.46565 -0.27491 -0.00183 -0.01213 -0.00084 -1.41891 -4.51072 0.00042 0.00002 -0.08063 -0.00068 
56 -2.89608 -9.07922 -0.26379 -0.00175 -0.01163 -0.00080 -1.36099 -4.32658 0.00041 0.00002 -0.07736 -0.00065 
57 -2.76404 -8.66526 -0.25187 -0.00167 -0.01110 -0.00077 -1.29893 -4.12931 0.00039 0.00002 -0.07385 -0.00062 
58 -2.62968 -8.24406 -0.23973 -0.00159 -0.01056 -0.00073 -1.23580 -3.92859 0.00036 0.00002 -0.07028 -0.00059 
59 -3.36169 -10.53891 -0.30735 -0.00204 -0.01350 -0.00093 -1.57980 -5.02218 0.00045 0.00002 -0.09000 -0.00076 
60 -3.22755 -10.11837 -0.29520 -0.00196 -0.01296 -0.00090 -1.51676 -4.82178 0.00043 0.00002 -0.08643 -0.00073 
61 -3.08625 -9.67541 -0.28240 -0.00187 -0.01239 -0.00086 -1.45036 -4.61069 0.00041 0.00002 -0.08266 -0.00069 
62 -2.93603 -9.20444 -0.26877 -0.00178 -0.01179 -0.00081 -1.37976 -4.38626 0.00039 0.00002 -0.07866 -0.00066 
63 -3.66783 -11.49864 -0.33671 -0.00223 -0.01473 -0.00102 -1.72367 -5.47954 0.00047 0.00001 -0.09843 -0.00082 
64 -3.50756 -10.99619 -0.32214 -0.00214 -0.01408 -0.00097 -1.64835 -5.24011 0.00044 0.00001 -0.09416 -0.00079 
65 -3.34356 -10.48205 -0.30722 -0.00204 -0.01343 -0.00093 -1.57128 -4.99510 0.00042 0.00001 -0.08978 -0.00075 
66 -4.07582 -12.77771 -0.37554 -0.00249 -0.01637 -0.00113 -1.91541 -6.08908 0.00049 0.00001 -0.10962 -0.00091 
67 -3.88998 -12.19509 -0.35859 -0.00238 -0.01562 -0.00108 -1.82807 -5.81144 0.00047 0.00001 -0.10465 -0.00087 
68 -3.68981 -11.56755 -0.34032 -0.00226 -0.01481 -0.00103 -1.73400 -5.51239 0.00044 0.00001 -0.09930 -0.00083 
69 -4.41392 -13.83763 -0.40821 -0.00270 -0.01772 -0.00123 -2.07430 -6.59419 0.00051 0.00000 -0.11898 -0.00099 
70 -4.18151 -13.10902 -0.38694 -0.00256 -0.01679 -0.00117 -1.96508 -6.24698 0.00048 0.00000 -0.11275 -0.00093 
71 -3.93637 -12.34051 -0.36448 -0.00241 -0.01580 -0.00110 -1.84988 -5.88076 0.00044 0.00000 -0.10618 -0.00088 
72 -4.61710 -14.47462 -0.42868 -0.00284 -0.01854 -0.00129 -2.16979 -6.89776 0.00050 0.00000 -0.12474 -0.00103 
73 -4.34859 -13.63283 -0.40400 -0.00267 -0.01746 -0.00121 -2.04360 -6.49661 0.00047 0.00000 -0.11753 -0.00097 
74 -5.01054 -15.70805 -0.46676 -0.00309 -0.02011 -0.00140 -2.35469 -7.48555 0.00052 -0.00001 -0.13564 -0.00111 
75 -4.67897 -14.66858 -0.43620 -0.00288 -0.01878 -0.00131 -2.19887 -6.99021 0.00048 -0.00001 -0.12672 -0.00104 
76 -4.32773 -13.56743 -0.40376 -0.00267 -0.01737 -0.00121 -2.03380 -6.46546 0.00043 -0.00001 -0.11727 -0.00096 
77 -4.94947 -15.51659 -0.46300 -0.00306 -0.01987 -0.00139 -2.32599 -7.39433 0.00047 -0.00002 -0.13433 -0.00110 
78 -4.60300 -14.43040 -0.43090 -0.00284 -0.01848 -0.00129 -2.16317 -6.87672 0.00044 -0.00002 -0.12498 -0.00102 
79 -5.23128 -16.40006 -0.49098 -0.00324 -0.02100 -0.00147 -2.45844 -7.81537 0.00047 -0.00003 -0.14226 -0.00116 
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80 -5.87413 -18.41540 -0.55270 -0.00364 -0.02358 -0.00165 -2.76055 -8.77578 0.00051 -0.00004 -0.15998 -0.00130 
81 -5.48998 -17.21108 -0.51692 -0.00341 -0.02203 -0.00154 -2.58002 -8.20187 0.00047 -0.00004 -0.14958 -0.00121 
82 -6.16080 -19.31410 -0.58146 -0.00383 -0.02472 -0.00173 -2.89527 -9.20407 0.00050 -0.00005 -0.16810 -0.00136 
83 -5.81212 -18.22098 -0.54889 -0.00362 -0.02333 -0.00163 -2.73141 -8.68315 0.00046 -0.00005 -0.15864 -0.00128 
84 -6.50091 -20.38036 -0.61534 -0.00405 -0.02609 -0.00183 -3.05511 -9.71221 0.00049 -0.00006 -0.17769 -0.00143 
85 -7.22381 -22.64666 -0.68526 -0.00451 -0.02899 -0.00203 -3.39485 -10.79222 0.00052 -0.00007 -0.19770 -0.00159 
86 -6.85295 -21.48400 -0.65047 -0.00428 -0.02750 -0.00193 -3.22056 -10.23816 0.00049 -0.00007 -0.18762 -0.00151 
87 -7.58590 -23.78179 -0.72156 -0.00475 -0.03044 -0.00214 -3.56502 -11.33319 0.00051 -0.00009 -0.20795 -0.00167 
88 -8.34487 -26.16116 -0.79537 -0.00523 -0.03348 -0.00235 -3.92170 -12.46709 0.00053 -0.00010 -0.22904 -0.00183 
89 -9.09603 -28.51605 -0.86871 -0.00571 -0.03650 -0.00257 -4.27472 -13.58933 0.00055 -0.00012 -0.24996 -0.00199 
90 -8.69516 -27.25933 -0.83090 -0.00546 -0.03489 -0.00245 -4.08633 -12.99044 0.00052 -0.00012 -0.23903 -0.00191 
91 -9.45602 -29.64462 -0.90537 -0.00595 -0.03794 -0.00267 -4.44390 -14.12717 0.00053 -0.00013 -0.26025 -0.00207 
92 -10.17640 -31.90302 -0.97626 -0.00641 -0.04083 -0.00288 -4.78246 -15.20343 0.00054 -0.00015 -0.28041 -0.00223 
93 -10.88757 -34.13254 -1.04652 -0.00687 -0.04368 -0.00308 -5.11668 -16.26593 0.00054 -0.00017 -0.30036 -0.00238 
94 -11.54460 -36.19233 -1.11187 -0.00729 -0.04631 -0.00327 -5.42547 -17.24755 0.00053 -0.00019 -0.31886 -0.00252 
95 -13.42639 -42.09174 -1.29723 -0.00850 -0.05386 -0.00381 -6.30984 -20.05898 0.00054 -0.00024 -0.37156 -0.00292 
96 -13.87301 -43.49188 -1.34322 -0.00880 -0.05565 -0.00394 -6.51974 -20.72625 0.00051 -0.00027 -0.38441 -0.00302 
97 -15.41719 -48.33290 -1.49780 -0.00980 -0.06184 -0.00438 -7.24546 -23.03330 0.00048 -0.00032 -0.42808 -0.00335 
98 -16.23992 -50.91216 -1.58395 -0.01036 -0.06513 -0.00462 -7.63213 -24.26253 0.00039 -0.00036 -0.45201 -0.00352 
99 -16.38735 -51.37434 -1.60851 -0.01050 -0.06571 -0.00468 -7.70144 -24.48288 0.00021 -0.00041 -0.45788 -0.00354 
100 -112.08810 -351.39619 -11.66160 -0.07512 -0.44892 -0.03281 -52.67930 -167.46749 -0.01041 -0.00588 -3.24650 -0.02331 
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1 11.84120 37.12215 1.85031 0.01103 0.04690 0.00422 5.56709 17.69778 0.01222 0.00348 0.45046 0.00164 
2 -0.01460 -0.04578 0.27164 0.00136 -0.00029 0.00033 -0.00600 -0.01908 0.00491 0.00126 0.04706 -0.00037 
3 -1.33755 -4.19323 -0.00228 -0.00021 -0.00547 -0.00022 -0.62819 -1.99703 0.00234 0.00056 -0.01495 -0.00046 
4 -1.14935 -3.60320 -0.05525 -0.00045 -0.00466 -0.00026 -0.53997 -1.71656 0.00105 0.00024 -0.02211 -0.00032 
5 -0.78073 -2.44759 -0.04696 -0.00035 -0.00316 -0.00019 -0.36682 -1.16612 0.00054 0.00012 -0.01666 -0.00021 
6 -0.71425 -2.23917 -0.04745 -0.00034 -0.00288 -0.00018 -0.33560 -1.06687 0.00042 0.00009 -0.01602 -0.00018 
7 -0.74741 -2.34312 -0.05303 -0.00038 -0.00301 -0.00019 -0.35119 -1.11643 0.00038 0.00007 -0.01735 -0.00019 
8 -0.49485 -1.55136 -0.03635 -0.00026 -0.00199 -0.00013 -0.23252 -0.73919 0.00023 0.00004 -0.01170 -0.00012 
9 -0.33800 -1.05964 -0.02549 -0.00018 -0.00136 -0.00009 -0.15883 -0.50490 0.00014 0.00003 -0.00811 -0.00008 
10 -0.25222 -0.79071 -0.01943 -0.00013 -0.00102 -0.00007 -0.11852 -0.37676 0.00010 0.00002 -0.00612 -0.00006 
11 -0.25495 -0.79926 -0.01999 -0.00014 -0.00103 -0.00007 -0.11980 -0.38084 0.00009 0.00002 -0.00625 -0.00006 
12 0.14569 0.45673 0.01150 0.00008 0.00059 0.00004 0.06846 0.21763 -0.00005 -0.00001 0.00358 0.00004 
13 -0.01498 -0.04695 -0.00120 -0.00001 -0.00006 0.00000 -0.00704 -0.02237 0.00001 0.00000 -0.00037 0.00000 
14 -0.23120 -0.72482 -0.01868 -0.00013 -0.00093 -0.00006 -0.10864 -0.34538 0.00008 0.00001 -0.00576 -0.00006 
15 -0.49859 -1.56306 -0.04070 -0.00028 -0.00201 -0.00013 -0.23429 -0.74481 0.00015 0.00003 -0.01250 -0.00012 
16 -0.24537 -0.76923 -0.02009 -0.00014 -0.00099 -0.00007 -0.11530 -0.36654 0.00008 0.00001 -0.00616 -0.00006 
17 -0.56759 -1.77940 -0.04687 -0.00032 -0.00228 -0.00015 -0.26672 -0.84790 0.00017 0.00003 -0.01432 -0.00013 
18 -0.92997 -2.91545 -0.07741 -0.00053 -0.00374 -0.00025 -0.43701 -1.38924 0.00026 0.00004 -0.02357 -0.00022 
19 -0.71361 -2.23715 -0.05953 -0.00040 -0.00287 -0.00019 -0.33533 -1.06603 0.00020 0.00003 -0.01811 -0.00017 
20 -1.10812 -3.47395 -0.09311 -0.00063 -0.00446 -0.00030 -0.52073 -1.65539 0.00030 0.00004 -0.02824 -0.00026 
21 -1.52878 -4.79273 -0.12934 -0.00088 -0.00615 -0.00041 -0.71840 -2.28381 0.00039 0.00006 -0.03911 -0.00036 
22 -1.31935 -4.13618 -0.11181 -0.00076 -0.00531 -0.00036 -0.61999 -1.97095 0.00034 0.00005 -0.03379 -0.00031 
23 -1.76685 -5.53906 -0.15068 -0.00102 -0.00710 -0.00048 -0.83028 -2.63946 0.00043 0.00006 -0.04541 -0.00041 
24 -1.56426 -4.90395 -0.13361 -0.00090 -0.00629 -0.00042 -0.73508 -2.33682 0.00038 0.00005 -0.04024 -0.00036 
25 -2.02968 -6.36305 -0.17439 -0.00118 -0.00816 -0.00055 -0.95380 -3.03212 0.00047 0.00006 -0.05239 -0.00047 
26 -1.83485 -5.75225 -0.15787 -0.00106 -0.00738 -0.00050 -0.86224 -2.74106 0.00042 0.00006 -0.04740 -0.00043 
27 -2.31864 -7.26895 -0.20060 -0.00135 -0.00932 -0.00063 -1.08959 -3.46381 0.00052 0.00007 -0.06009 -0.00054 
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28 -2.11432 -6.62839 -0.18317 -0.00123 -0.00850 -0.00057 -0.99357 -3.15857 0.00047 0.00006 -0.05484 -0.00049 
29 -2.62450 -8.22781 -0.22855 -0.00154 -0.01055 -0.00071 -1.23332 -3.92074 0.00056 0.00007 -0.06828 -0.00060 
30 -2.42188 -7.59258 -0.21116 -0.00142 -0.00973 -0.00066 -1.13811 -3.61804 0.00051 0.00006 -0.06305 -0.00056 
31 -2.94057 -9.21869 -0.25766 -0.00173 -0.01182 -0.00080 -1.38186 -4.39294 0.00059 0.00007 -0.07678 -0.00068 
32 -2.75427 -8.63463 -0.24159 -0.00162 -0.01107 -0.00075 -1.29431 -4.11462 0.00055 0.00006 -0.07196 -0.00063 
33 -3.30542 -10.36248 -0.29128 -0.00195 -0.01328 -0.00090 -1.55332 -4.93800 0.00064 0.00007 -0.08659 -0.00076 
34 -3.11012 -9.75023 -0.27435 -0.00184 -0.01250 -0.00085 -1.46154 -4.64624 0.00060 0.00006 -0.08152 -0.00071 
35 -2.91925 -9.15185 -0.25776 -0.00173 -0.01173 -0.00080 -1.37185 -4.36111 0.00056 0.00006 -0.07656 -0.00067 
36 -3.50150 -10.97721 -0.31050 -0.00208 -0.01407 -0.00096 -1.64547 -5.23095 0.00064 0.00006 -0.09207 -0.00080 
37 -3.31173 -10.38228 -0.29394 -0.00197 -0.01331 -0.00091 -1.55629 -4.94745 0.00060 0.00006 -0.08712 -0.00076 
38 -3.12208 -9.78772 -0.27736 -0.00186 -0.01254 -0.00086 -1.46717 -4.66413 0.00056 0.00006 -0.08218 -0.00071 
39 -3.73043 -11.69491 -0.33273 -0.00222 -0.01499 -0.00102 -1.75306 -5.57298 0.00065 0.00006 -0.09842 -0.00085 
40 -3.53841 -11.09292 -0.31587 -0.00211 -0.01422 -0.00097 -1.66282 -5.28611 0.00061 0.00006 -0.09340 -0.00081 
41 -4.15640 -13.03030 -0.37247 -0.00249 -0.01670 -0.00114 -1.95324 -6.20935 0.00069 0.00006 -0.10996 -0.00094 
42 -3.96297 -12.42390 -0.35543 -0.00237 -0.01592 -0.00109 -1.86234 -5.92038 0.00065 0.00005 -0.10489 -0.00090 
43 -3.77028 -11.81983 -0.33841 -0.00226 -0.01515 -0.00104 -1.77179 -5.63252 0.00062 0.00005 -0.09984 -0.00086 
44 -4.40104 -13.79725 -0.39648 -0.00264 -0.01768 -0.00121 -2.06821 -6.57484 0.00070 0.00005 -0.11680 -0.00100 
45 -4.19917 -13.16439 -0.37859 -0.00252 -0.01687 -0.00116 -1.97335 -6.27327 0.00066 0.00005 -0.11149 -0.00095 
46 -3.99943 -12.53821 -0.36086 -0.00240 -0.01606 -0.00110 -1.87948 -5.97487 0.00062 0.00005 -0.10624 -0.00091 
47 -4.65393 -14.59008 -0.42137 -0.00280 -0.01869 -0.00129 -2.18706 -6.95267 0.00070 0.00005 -0.12387 -0.00105 
48 -4.44733 -13.94238 -0.40296 -0.00268 -0.01786 -0.00123 -2.08997 -6.64403 0.00066 0.00004 -0.11843 -0.00100 
49 -4.23415 -13.27406 -0.38394 -0.00255 -0.01701 -0.00117 -1.98979 -6.32555 0.00062 0.00004 -0.11280 -0.00096 
50 -4.90020 -15.36213 -0.44580 -0.00296 -0.01968 -0.00136 -2.30280 -7.32060 0.00070 0.00004 -0.13080 -0.00110 
51 -4.68327 -14.68205 -0.42638 -0.00283 -0.01881 -0.00130 -2.20086 -6.99653 0.00066 0.00004 -0.12506 -0.00105 
52 -4.46133 -13.98627 -0.40647 -0.00270 -0.01792 -0.00124 -2.09656 -6.66496 0.00062 0.00003 -0.11919 -0.00100 
53 -5.12495 -16.06672 -0.46842 -0.00311 -0.02058 -0.00142 -2.40843 -7.65639 0.00069 0.00003 -0.13718 -0.00115 
54 -4.90316 -15.37140 -0.44846 -0.00298 -0.01969 -0.00136 -2.30420 -7.32504 0.00065 0.00003 -0.13129 -0.00110 
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55 -4.67377 -14.65226 -0.42778 -0.00284 -0.01877 -0.00130 -2.19640 -6.98235 0.00062 0.00002 -0.12520 -0.00105 
56 -5.34952 -16.77073 -0.49113 -0.00326 -0.02148 -0.00149 -2.51397 -7.99190 0.00068 0.00002 -0.14357 -0.00120 
57 -5.13359 -16.09379 -0.47160 -0.00313 -0.02061 -0.00143 -2.41249 -7.66931 0.00065 0.00002 -0.13782 -0.00115 
58 -4.89419 -15.34328 -0.44992 -0.00298 -0.01965 -0.00136 -2.29999 -7.31167 0.00061 0.00002 -0.13145 -0.00110 
59 -5.57760 -17.48576 -0.51425 -0.00341 -0.02239 -0.00155 -2.62116 -8.33266 0.00067 0.00001 -0.15007 -0.00125 
60 -5.33330 -16.71988 -0.49205 -0.00326 -0.02141 -0.00148 -2.50635 -7.96769 0.00063 0.00001 -0.14355 -0.00119 
61 -6.03512 -18.92009 -0.55836 -0.00370 -0.02423 -0.00168 -2.83617 -9.01619 0.00069 0.00000 -0.16271 -0.00135 
62 -5.79266 -18.15999 -0.53627 -0.00355 -0.02326 -0.00161 -2.72223 -8.65398 0.00066 0.00000 -0.15623 -0.00129 
63 -5.55122 -17.40307 -0.51423 -0.00340 -0.02229 -0.00155 -2.60877 -8.29328 0.00062 0.00000 -0.14978 -0.00124 
64 -6.28987 -19.71876 -0.58419 -0.00386 -0.02525 -0.00176 -2.95590 -9.39681 0.00068 -0.00001 -0.16997 -0.00140 
65 -6.05097 -18.96980 -0.56232 -0.00372 -0.02429 -0.00169 -2.84363 -9.03991 0.00065 -0.00001 -0.16357 -0.00135 
66 -6.80107 -21.32134 -0.63364 -0.00419 -0.02730 -0.00190 -3.19614 -10.16053 0.00070 -0.00002 -0.18413 -0.00151 
67 -6.57102 -20.60014 -0.61253 -0.00405 -0.02638 -0.00184 -3.08803 -9.81685 0.00067 -0.00002 -0.17796 -0.00146 
68 -6.35353 -19.91831 -0.59254 -0.00392 -0.02550 -0.00178 -2.98582 -9.49193 0.00064 -0.00002 -0.17212 -0.00141 
69 -7.13816 -22.37814 -0.66732 -0.00441 -0.02865 -0.00200 -3.35457 -10.66416 0.00069 -0.00003 -0.19365 -0.00158 
70 -6.90555 -21.64890 -0.64590 -0.00427 -0.02772 -0.00193 -3.24525 -10.31665 0.00066 -0.00003 -0.18740 -0.00153 
71 -7.71054 -24.17255 -0.72285 -0.00477 -0.03095 -0.00216 -3.62356 -11.51930 0.00071 -0.00004 -0.20953 -0.00171 
72 -8.52949 -26.73996 -0.80143 -0.00529 -0.03423 -0.00239 -4.00843 -12.74280 0.00075 -0.00005 -0.23210 -0.00189 
73 -8.30730 -26.04339 -0.78090 -0.00515 -0.03334 -0.00233 -3.90401 -12.41086 0.00073 -0.00005 -0.22611 -0.00184 
74 -9.14903 -28.68222 -0.86189 -0.00568 -0.03672 -0.00257 -4.29959 -13.66840 0.00077 -0.00006 -0.24935 -0.00202 
75 -8.92654 -27.98471 -0.84129 -0.00555 -0.03583 -0.00251 -4.19503 -13.33601 0.00074 -0.00006 -0.24335 -0.00197 
76 -9.80473 -30.73783 -0.92596 -0.00610 -0.03935 -0.00275 -4.60774 -14.64801 0.00078 -0.00008 -0.26762 -0.00216 
77 -10.68301 -33.49124 -1.01096 -0.00666 -0.04287 -0.00300 -5.02050 -15.96016 0.00082 -0.00010 -0.29195 -0.00235 
78 -10.46333 -32.80252 -0.99056 -0.00652 -0.04199 -0.00294 -4.91726 -15.63196 0.00079 -0.00010 -0.28601 -0.00231 
79 -11.36569 -35.63144 -1.07810 -0.00710 -0.04561 -0.00320 -5.34133 -16.98009 0.00082 -0.00011 -0.31105 -0.00250 
80 -12.28841 -38.52417 -1.16785 -0.00768 -0.04931 -0.00346 -5.77497 -18.35864 0.00085 -0.00013 -0.33669 -0.00270 
81 -12.05649 -37.79710 -1.14625 -0.00754 -0.04838 -0.00340 -5.66598 -18.01216 0.00082 -0.00013 -0.33041 -0.00265 
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Percentile Gasoline Diesel 
Highway 2 FC CO2 CO HC NOx PM FC CO2 CO HC NOx PM 
82 -12.99028 -40.72453 -1.23733 -0.00814 -0.05212 -0.00366 -6.10483 -19.40725 0.00085 -0.00015 -0.35640 -0.00285 
83 -13.93393 -43.68287 -1.32964 -0.00874 -0.05591 -0.00393 -6.54831 -20.81707 0.00086 -0.00018 -0.38271 -0.00306 
84 -14.91211 -46.74946 -1.42549 -0.00936 -0.05983 -0.00421 -7.00801 -22.27848 0.00088 -0.00020 -0.41001 -0.00327 
85 -14.65499 -45.94339 -1.40144 -0.00921 -0.05880 -0.00414 -6.88718 -21.89435 0.00086 -0.00020 -0.40304 -0.00321 
86 -15.61956 -48.96732 -1.49631 -0.00982 -0.06267 -0.00441 -7.34049 -23.33543 0.00086 -0.00023 -0.43002 -0.00342 
87 -16.58883 -52.00597 -1.59191 -0.01045 -0.06655 -0.00469 -7.79601 -24.78353 0.00087 -0.00025 -0.45718 -0.00363 
88 -17.55570 -55.03711 -1.68758 -0.01107 -0.07043 -0.00497 -8.25041 -26.22805 0.00087 -0.00028 -0.48433 -0.00383 
89 -17.24190 -54.05334 -1.65810 -0.01088 -0.06917 -0.00488 -8.10294 -25.75924 0.00084 -0.00028 -0.47579 -0.00377 
90 -18.19042 -57.02698 -1.75230 -0.01149 -0.07297 -0.00515 -8.54871 -27.17636 0.00083 -0.00031 -0.50249 -0.00397 
91 -19.14552 -60.02120 -1.84740 -0.01211 -0.07680 -0.00543 -8.99758 -28.60330 0.00082 -0.00034 -0.52941 -0.00417 
92 -20.06896 -62.91619 -1.93978 -0.01271 -0.08050 -0.00569 -9.43157 -29.98295 0.00080 -0.00037 -0.55551 -0.00437 
93 -20.98286 -65.78127 -2.03153 -0.01330 -0.08417 -0.00596 -9.86107 -31.34835 0.00078 -0.00040 -0.58140 -0.00456 
94 -21.80710 -68.36525 -2.11503 -0.01385 -0.08747 -0.00619 -10.24844 -32.57979 0.00074 -0.00043 -0.60489 -0.00474 
95 -23.96034 -75.11568 -2.33059 -0.01525 -0.09610 -0.00681 -11.26040 -35.79681 0.00069 -0.00051 -0.66578 -0.00520 
96 -24.62556 -77.20112 -2.39969 -0.01569 -0.09876 -0.00701 -11.57304 -36.79068 0.00063 -0.00054 -0.68503 -0.00534 
97 -26.42374 -82.83843 -2.58293 -0.01688 -0.10597 -0.00753 -12.41814 -39.47726 0.00053 -0.00062 -0.73644 -0.00572 
98 -27.60575 -86.54401 -2.70801 -0.01768 -0.11070 -0.00788 -12.97366 -41.24328 0.00039 -0.00069 -0.77104 -0.00596 
99 -30.14370 -94.50050 -2.97592 -0.01940 -0.12086 -0.00863 -14.16647 -45.03520 0.00008 -0.00084 -0.84522 -0.00648 
100 -172.1554 -539.7071 -17.9738 -0.1156 -0.6894     -0.0504 -80.9100 -257.2128 -0.0171 -0.0093 -4.9972 -0.0357 
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Appendix 17: Emission factors by speed level for an average 2015 passenger car by 
fuel type. 
Average Diesel vehicle 
 80 90 100 110 120 130 >130 
FC 40.1570 39.7314 40.6430 44.7432 47.6392 50.8867 56.7559 
CO2 111.7311 110.5470 113.0833 124.4915 132.5492 141.5849 157.9149 
CO 0.0175 0.0126 0.0100 0.0125 0.0092 0.0072 0.0075 
HC 0.0073 0.0069 0.0065 0.0057 0.0053 0.0057 0.0065 
NOx 0.4936 0.5646 0.5930 0.6714 0.8468 1.1338 1.4845 
PM 0.0068 0.0064 0.0069 0.0073 0.0083 0.0097 0.0104 
        
Average Gasoline vehicle 
 80 90 100 110 120 130 >130 
FC 46.7305 46.5712 48.6153 55.3889 63.1100 69.5586 75.3210 
CO2 130.4649 130.0199 135.7270 154.6379 176.1940 194.1974 210.2854 
CO 0.3106 0.2926 0.4021 0.6135 1.0270 1.9508 3.9251 
HC 0.0115 0.0119 0.0136 0.0150 0.0180 0.0250 0.0414 
NOx 0.0524 0.0575 0.0578 0.0691 0.0830 0.1177 0.1302 
PM 0.0012 0.0012 0.0016 0.0024 0.0041 0.0060 0.0078 
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